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A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R performs two
tasks. First, the protocol enables party S to send to party R some text x
along with sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed
sent by S. Second, the protocol enables party R to receive text x from S and
to send to S sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed
received by R. The first generation of nonrepudiation protocols were published
in the period 1996-2000. In this dissertation, we design a second generation of
nonrepudiation protocols that enjoy several interesting properties.
First, we identify in this dissertation a special class of nonrepudiation
protocols, called two-phase protocols. The two parties, S and R, in each two-
phase protocol execute the protocol as specified until one of the two parties
receives its needed proof. Then and only then does this party refrain from
sending any more message specified by the protocol because these messages
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only help the other party complete its proof. We show that the execution of
each two-phase protocol is deterministic and does not require synchronized
real-time clocks. We also show that each two-phase protocol needs to involve
a trusted third party T beside the two original parties, S and R.
Second, we show that if party R in a two-phase protocol has a real-time
clock and knows an upper bound on the round trip delay from R to S and
back to R, then the two-phase protocol does not need to involve a trusted
third party T .
Third, we design a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring file F from
a sender S to a receiver R over a cloud C. This protocol is designed such
that there is no direct communication between parties S and R. Rather all
communications between S and R are carried out through cloud C. In this
protocol parties S and R do not need to store a local copy of file F and the
proofs that are needed by the two parties S and R (the only copy of file F and
the proofs is stored in cloud C).
Fourth, we design a new nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over C
where some of the proofs stored in cloud C get lost. This new protocol has an
interesting stabilization property which ensures that when some of the proofs
get lost, and one party can get the needed proofs but the other party cannot
get its needed proofs from cloud C, then eventually, neither party is able to
receive its needed proofs from cloud C.
Fifth, we design a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring files from a
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sender S to a subset of potential receivers {R.1, R.2, . . ., R.n} over a cloud
C. The protocol guarantees that after each file F is transferred from sender S
to a subset of the potential receivers, then (1) each receiver Ri in the subset
ends up with a proof that file F was indeed sent by sender S to Ri, and (2)
sender S ends up with a proof that file F was indeed received from S by each
receiver Ri in the subset.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R performs two tasks.
First, the protocol enables party S to send to party R some text x along with
sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed sent by S.
Second, the protocol enables party R to receive text x from S and to send to
S sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed received
by R. Nonrepudiation protocols have important applications in the world
of e-commerce and cybersecurity. Whenever, an item is exchanged over the
internet, there are concerns regarding whether the sender or the receiver of
the item can later repudiate having sent or received the item. Nonrepudiation
protocols would allow the sender of an item, to obtain a proof that the receiver
indeed received the item. Similarly, the protocol would allow the receiver of
an item, to obtain a proof that the sender indeed sent the item. These proofs
can be submitted to a judge which verifies the submitted proof and declares
whether the proof is valid or not. The decision of the judge is legally binding.
Research in nonrepudiation protocols started in 1996 when Gollmann
and Zhou published the first paper about nonrepudiation protocols [62]. This
paper described the first nonrepudiation protocol which involved three parties:
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party S, party R, and a trusted third party T . Next, we give a high-level
description of the Gollmann-Zhou protocol.
The Gollmann-Zhou protocol consists of the following five steps:
• Party S sends an encrypted text C to party R, alongwith a proof that
C was sent by S to R.
• Party R sends back an acknowledgement by sending a proof that C was
received by R from S.
• Party S sends the key K, which can be used to decrypt C, to trusted
third party T .
• Party R can retrieve the key K and proof that key was issued by T from
party T .
• Party S can also retrieve the proof that key was issued by T from party
T .
After executing five steps of the protocol, party S ends up with following two
items: a proof that C was received by R from S from step 2, and proof that
key was issued by party T from step 5. Both these items are required to prove
to a judge that message M , whose encryption is C, was indeed received by
party R from S.
Similarly, after five steps of the protocol, party R ends up with the
following three items: a proof that C was sent by S to R from step 1, and
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both key K and a proof that key was issued by T from step 4. These items
are needed to prove to a judge that message M , was indeed sent by party S
to R.
The proof that C was sent by S to R is signed using the private key of
party S which only party S knows. Similarly, the proof that C was received
by R from S is signed using the private key of party R which only party R
knows. The proof that key K was issued by T is signed using the private key
of party T which only party T knows, and this proof proves that key K was
received by trusted third party T from party S.
After the publication of the Gollmann-Zhou protocol in 1996, there
appeared many papers related to the topic of nonrepudiation. We refer to
these papers which appeared in the period 1996-2000 as the first generation of
nonrepudiation protocols. This generation of nonrepudiation protocols made
many contributions to this area of research. Most notably, the idea of opti-
mistic nonrepudiation protocol was introduced during this era [39, 40, 65]. In
optimistic nonrepudiation protocols, the trusted third party is not involved
in every execution of the protocol. Rather, the protocol is designed to work
without the involvement of the trusted third party provided both parties, S
and R, execute the protocol as specified. If a party, S or R, deviates from the
specified behaviour, then the trusted third party is involved in the execution
of the protocol, to ensure the correctness of the nonrepudiation protocol, i.e.,
either both parties S and R end up with the needed evidence, or neither of
them ends up with its needed evidence. Hence, some executions of the nonre-
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pudiation protocol involve the trusted third party T while other executions do
not involve the third party T . This was a major improvement in the design of
the nonrepudiation protocols, as the trusted third party T can easily become
a bottleneck, and become a single point of failure. Optimistic nonrepudiation
protocols allowed to minimize the involvement of the trusted third party T ,
and only involved party T when a party decided to deviate from its specified
behavior. More details about optimistic nonrepudiation protocols is included
in the related works chapter.
Another important contribution of the first generation of nonrepudia-
tion protocols is the protocol presented by Markowitch and Yves Roggeman in
1999 [41]. This nonrepudiation protocol only involved two parties, S and R,
without any involvement of a third party. While this protocol made an interest-
ing contribution, it also made some strong assumptions about the computing
power of the parties involved. The protocol made the assumption, that party S
knows an upper bound on the computing power of party R. In particular, the
assumption was that the minimum time party R takes to decrypt a message is
greater than the upper bound on the round-trip delay from S to R, and back
to S. This assumption was quite unrealistic since party R can always decrease
the time it takes to decrypt a message by buying more computing power, e.g.,
by employing a supercomputer. This unrealistic assumption made the prac-
tical use of this protocol questionable. Also, this protocol made the readers
think whether a protocol can be designed which does not involve a trusted
third party, and also does not rely on unreasonable set of assumptions. An
4
important contribution of this thesis, which presents the second generation
of nonrepudiation protocols, is the design of a nonrepudiation protocol from
S to R that does not involve a trusted third party which does not rely on
unreasonable set of assumptions.
1.1 Limitations of Previous Work
The first generation of nonrepudiation protocols suffered from some
drawbacks and limitations. The first important drawback of this generation
of nonrepudiation protocols is that there is no formal method of specifying
nonrepudiation protocols. This lack of formalism in the specification of nonre-
pudiation protocols has made the task of verifying these protocols very hard.
A number of nonrepudiation protocols have been shown to be incorrect after
they were published [24, 25, 28]. Also, a lack of formal specification made
these protocols unnecessarily complicated, for example, many protocols made
use of a large number of different message types [39], which makes the pro-
tocol hard to reason about and prove correct. In Chapter 3, we address the
question of whether a simple formal specification of nonrepudiation protocols
is possible which allows for easy verification of nonrepudiation protocols. In
Chapter 3, we introduce two-phase nonrepudiation protocols which are easy
to specify and verify. We also design a number of two-phase protocols to show
their wide applicability.
Another drawback of the first generation of nonrepudiation protocols
is that protocols which were designed to involve only two parties, S and R,
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without any involvement of a trusted third party, made unrealistic assump-
tions. The protocol by Markowitch and Roggeman, which we refer to as MR
protocol, raised several questions about the design of nonrepudiation proto-
cols that do not involve a trusted third party. The first question was whether
it is possible to design a nonrepudiation protocol from S to R that does not
impose the unrealistic assumption of party S knowing an upper bound on the
computing power of party R? The second question was that is it possible to
establish the necessary and sufficient conditions to design the nonrepudiation
protocol from S to R that does not involve a trusted third party? Another
question was whether the protocol can be extended from S to R to the case
where the protocol is executed from S to {R.1, R.2, · · · , R.n} where each
R.i wants a proof that a text x was indeed sent by S to R.i, and S wants a
proof that a text x was received by each R.i from S. In this dissertation, we
provide an answer to all these questions in Chapter 4. The protocol presented
in Chapter 4 is the first nonrepudiation protocol from S to R that does not in-
volve a trusted third party, and makes (only) a set of reasonable assumptions.
Moreover, these assumptions are proved to be necessary and sufficient.
A third important limitation of the first generation of nonrepudiation
protocols is that the protocols were designed assuming direct communication
between S and R. Many emerging communication models do not necessarily
allow a direct communication between the parties involved in the protocol.
One such model involves the cloud where every communication is carried out
through the cloud. In this thesis, we address the question of how to design
6
nonrepudiation protocols that do not allow direct communication between
involved parties. In our model, every communication is carried out through
the cloud. In Chapter 5, we discuss in detail the design of nonrepudiation
protocol that transfers a file F from S to R in cloud systems. In this protocol,
the only copy of file F and the needed proofs is stored in the cloud.
In Chapter 6, we design a new nonrepudiation protocol from S to R
in cloud system where some of the proofs stored in cloud get lost. We first
show that the protocol presented in Chapter 5 suffers from a compromised state
when some of the proofs stored in the cloud get lost. In the compromised state
of the protocol, one party is able to receive its needed proofs but the other
party is not able to receive its needed proofs. We design a new nonrepudiation
protocol which has an interesting stabilization property, which ensures that
when some of the proofs stored in the cloud get lost, and one party is able to
receive its needed proofs but the other party is not able to receive its needed
proofs, then eventually, neither party S or R is able to receive its needed proofs.
This is the first ever nonrepudiation protocol with stabilization property.
In Chapter 7, we extend the design of nonrepudiation protocol from S
to R presented in Chapter 5 to work from sender S to a subset of potential
receivers {R.1, R.2, . . ., R.n} over a cloud C. The protocol guarantees that
after each file F is transferred from sender S to a subset of the potential
receivers, then (1) each receiver Ri in the subset ends up with a proof that file
F was indeed sent by sender S to Ri, and (2) sender S ends up with a proof
that file F was indeed received from S by each receiver Ri in the subset.
7
1.2 Contributions
The drawbacks and limitations of the first generation of nonrepudiation
protocols inspired the second generation of nonrepudiation protocols which are
the subject of this dissertation. In the second generation of nonrepudiation
protocols, the following key contributions are made:
• We have identified a class of nonrepudiation protocols known as two-
phase nonrepudiation protocols. These protocols are deterministic, and
do not make use of real-time clocks. Also these protocols only make use
of two types of messages. These properties make the specification and
verification of two-phase protocols easier. We outline several two-phase
nonrepudiation protocols in Chapter 3, and also present their security
analysis. Also, we prove that every correct two-phase nonrepudiation
protocol needs to involve a trusted third party.
• We present the first provably correct nonrepudiation protocol from party
S to party R that does not involve a trusted third party. We also present
the necessary and sufficient conditions that need to be adopted to design
such a protocol. The protocol is first presented in a model where no
messages can get lost, and is later relaxed to handle the case where
messages can get lost. Also, the protocol is extended from S to R to
the case where it involves n+1 parties: S, R.1, R.2, · · · , R.n. These
contributions are presented in Chapter 4.
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• We design nonrepudiation protocols in cloud systems where no direct
communication is allowed between involved parties. In fact, every com-
munication is carried out through the cloud. We present the details of
the design of nonrepudiation protocol from S to R in this model, and
discuss the advantages of these protocols. These details are included in
Chapter 5.
• We present a nonrepudiation protocol from S to R in cloud sytems where
some of the proofs stored in the cloud get lost. This protocol has inter-
esting stabilization property which ensures that when some of the proofs
stored in the cloud get lost, and one party is able to receive its needed
proofs but the other party is not able to receive its needed proofs from
the cloud then, eventually, neither party S or R is able to receive its
needed proofs from the cloud. These details are presented in Chapter 6.
• We extend the design of nonrepudiation protocol from S to R presented
in Chapter 5 to work from sender S to a subset of potential receivers
{R.1, R.2, . . ., R.n} over a cloud C. These details are presented in
Chapter 7.
It is noteworthy that in Chapter 3 we prove that every correct two-phase
nonrepudiation protocol needs to involve a trusted third party, but later show
in Chapter 4 that one can design a nonrepudiation protocol from S to R that
does not involve a trusted third party. The reason for this difference is that in
two-phase protocols no real-time clock is allowed in designing these protocols.
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However, in Chapter 4 we relax this model and in fact party R is allowed to
keep a real-time clock. This difference in model is very important to keep in
mind while reading Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. We present the prior and related
works in Chapter 2. In Chapter 8, we present our conclusions, and thoughts
on future work.
10
Chapter 2
Prior Work
In this chapter, we discuss the previous work done in nonrepudiation
protocols. Research in nonrepudiation protocols started in 1996 when Dieter
Gollmann and Jianying Zhou published the first nonrepudiation protocol that
involved three parties: party S, party R, and party T [31, 62, 64]. Party T is
a trusted third party that is involved in every execution of the protocol. The
role of this party is to make sure that both the parties receive their needed
evidence. This protocol assumes that both parties S and R can communicate
(eventually) with the trusted party T in order to receive their evidence. One
major drawback of this protocol is that the trusted third party is involved in
every execution of the protocol, and is therefore, prone to becoming a bottle-
neck and a single point of failure.
The nonrepudiation protocol from S to R was later generalized to work
from S to multiple parties, R.1, R.2, R.3, · · · , R.n [29, 30, 44, 45]. In these
protocols, party S wants a proof that party R.i indeed received the text x
sent from S to R.i. Also, party R.i wants a proof that S indeed sent the
text x to R.i. These protocols were designed using group encryption scheme
which made sure that only those R.i which acknowledged to have received the
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encrypted text sent during first step of the protocol by party S are able to get
the proof that party S indeed sent text x to party R.i. These protocols also
involved the services of the trusted third party T . Therefore, these protocols
also suffered from the same problems where the trusted third party becomes
a bottleneck.
In order to overcome the drawback of having a trusted third party,
several nonrepudiation protocols were proposed which intended to limit the
involvement of the trusted third party [15, 26, 40, 65]. These protocols only in-
volved the trusted third party when any party (S or R) refrained from sending
a message as specified by the protocol. These protocols are known as optimistic
nonrepudiation protocols. These protocols were designed ”optimistically” as-
suming that most of the times, party S and party R, would follow the main
protocol as specified. If both parties follow the main protocol as specified,
then there is no need to involve the trusted third party. These protocols also
included a recovery protocol which can be invoked by any of the two parties
S and R. The recovery protocol is invoked by a party when it times-out and
concludes that the other party has stopped executing the protocol as speci-
fied. The recovery protocol executed with the help of the trusted third party
makes sure that both parties eventually terminate and either both receive the
needed evidence, or neither receive their needed evidence. In these protocols
it is assumed that the communication channel between S and trusted third
party T is reliable. Similarly, it is assumed that the communication channel
between R and T is reliable. Protocols were also proposed which extended the
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ideas of optimistic nonrepudiation protocol from S to R to multiple parties
which work from S to R.1, R.2, · · · , R.n [39]
Optimistic nonrepudiation protocols made an important contribution
towards the design of nonrepudiation protocols by limiting the involvement of
trusted third party. However, it did not answer the question whether nonre-
pudiation protocols can be designed which do not rely upon the services of a
trusted third party in any execution of the protocol. In 1999, Markowitch and
Roggeman published a nonrepudiation protocol (referred to as MR protocol)
which only has two parties S and R with no involvement of a trusted third
party T [41]. Although this protocol did not involve a trusted third party
but it made some assumptions which can easily be violated in practice. The
assumptions made by the MR protocol are as follows: 1) There is an upper
bound ub on the round-trip delay from S to R, and back to S, 2) There is a
lower bound lb on the time it takes party R to decrypt a message, and 3) lb
>ub. In practice, party R can always decrease the value of lb by purchasing
more computing power. Therefore, the correctness of the MR protocol re-
mained questionable. In this dissertation, we have presented a nonrepudiation
protocol from S to R that does not involve a trusted third party under a set
of reasonable assumptions [3]. More details about this protocol are presented
in Chapter 4.
One important problem with the first generation of nonrepudiation
protocols is that many protocols were shown to be incorrect after they got
published [24, 25, 28]. This is especially true for optimistic nonrepudiation
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protocols whose execution is highly non-deterministic, and involves many sub-
protocols. One contribution of this dissertation, is that we present a class of
nonrepudiation protocols known as two-phase which are inherently determin-
istic, and do not involve real-time clocks [2]. These protocols are easier to
specify and verify as compared to a protocol which is not two-phase. Two-
phase nonrepudiation protocols are discussed in depth in Chapter 3.
Many authors have explored the area of formally verifying the correct-
ness of nonrepudiation protocols [10, 32, 35, 37, 58]. The authors have used
theorem proving techniques to study the security properties of nonrepudiation
protocols in [10, 58]. In [35] authors use the PRISM model checker to analyse
the properties of nonrepudiation protocol that does not involve a trusted party
[41]. In [37] authors have formally specified nonrepudiation protocols using
spi calculus. In [32] authors use the model checker MOCHA to verify several
nonrepudiation protocols.
Nonrepudiation has some important applications. Perhaps the most
well-known of these applications is certified email protocols [46, 47]. The first
well-known certified email protocol was published in 1996 by Dieter Gollmann
and Jianying Zhou [63]. This paper introduced the requirements and architec-
ture of certified email, and also gave a protocol which involved n mail servers
in addition to the sender S and recipient R of the email. The protocol ensured
that the party S either gets a proof that the email was received by R, or it
gets informed that the email could not be delivered. The drawback of this
proposal was that the mail servers need to be trusted. Later, certified email
14
protocols were developed which limited the role of the trusted party.
In 1998, a new certified email protocol was published by Bruce and
James which only required the involvement of a time stamped public forum
(e.g., New York Times) instead of a fully trusted third party [54]. Other pro-
posals were made to limit the involvement of the trusted third party such that
not every execution of the certified email protocol involves the trusted third
party [6, 21]. This area of research is similar to optimistic nonrepudiation
protocols as discussed previously. In [21] the authors present a certified email
protocol which is optimistic and works in a minimum number of rounds. In
[6] the authors present a certified email protocol which uses agents as interme-
diaries which can conspire with any of the two parties S and R. The trusted
third party is invoked only when the agents fail or misbehave.
Later many researchers generalized certified email protocols from two
parties to multiple parties [20, 61, 67]. The first such protocol is presented
in [20] which is an optimistic protocol and ensures that the sender S sends
the same email to multiple recipients and also gets an acknowledgement from
them. Later, Jianying Zhou and others [61, 67] presented an improved version
of the multi-party certified email protocol with better security requirements.
Nonrepudiation has also found applications in a number of different
areas such as cloud security [17, 19, 33, 59], smart grids [60], mobile billing [38,
48, 66] and pay TV systems [36, 55, 56]. The first paper about nonrepudiation
in cloud systems involved (n+2) parties: party S, parties R.1, R.2, · · · , R.n,
and party C which is the cloud system [17]. This paper discussed about
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how to provide nonrepudiated evidence to the recipient of the message that
the message was indeed sent by the sender S through the cloud C. In this
dissertation, we provide an improved nonrepudiation protocol in cloud systems
which provide two clear advantages [1]. More details about this protocol are
included in Chapter 7.
The work presented in [18] investigates the problem of file integrity in
cloud systems, and gives a protocol to ensure that the file downloaded by party
R.i from a cloud system C, is indeed the same file F which party S uploaded
to the cloud system. However, the authors in [18] do not present a protocol
which satisfies the nonrepudiation requirements of the protocol presented in
Chapter 7. Authors in [27, 51] presented a system that allows the customers of
the cloud storage system, to detect and prove to a third party violations of four
desirable security properties: confidentiality, integrity, write-serializability and
read-freshness.
Nonrepudiation has also found applications in smart grid [9, 60]. In
[60], authors have proposed a solution to the energy theft caused by altering
meter readings. The authors porpose a protocol to ensure that smart meters
at both the producer and consumer side remain within known error bounds.
Authors in [38, 48, 66] have addressed the problem of mobile billing.
Disputes in mobile billing can arise when the provider of the service issues
a bill which is in error, but the client has no evidence to prove that the bill
has irregularities. In order to resolve such disputes, it is necessary that both
provider and subscriber have evidence of the total call time made by the sub-
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scriber on the given provider network. The problem gets more challenging as
mobile users can also roam into foreign networks. Authors have proposed pro-
tocols to address these issues using digital signatures and hash chains. Mobile
users need to submit a digital signature when requesting a call and release
chained hash values during the session so that the call and its duration are
undeniable.
Similar to mobile billing, there are applications of nonrepudiation to
the area of pay TV systems [36, 55, 56]. In pay TV systems, a subscriber
should only pay for the channels that he/she is registered for. In [36] authors
propose a protocol that allows the subscriber to register the channels, and also
suspend and/or change the channels the subscriber wishes to watch. Both the
system administrator and subscriber get evidence of the channels registered.
Nonrepudiation has also found application in digital rights management
(DRM) [43, 49]. Digital rights management ensure that copyright-protected
content like music or books is only used by users who paid for it. Nonrepu-
diation is an important requirement for digital rights management. Without
nonrepudiation parties can involve in malicious activities and there would be
no evidence to prove such activities to a third party. Examples include, a ser-
vice provider charging more money for a certain service, or a user stating that
he/she did not buy a multimedia content. Protocols are proposed which can
be integrated into existing DRM architectures, and allow for resolution of dis-
putes between participants. Nonrepudiation has also found usage in vehicular
networks and biometrics [34, 57].
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The problem of designing nonrepudiation protocols is similar to the
problem of designing contract signing protocols. In contract signing protocols
each participant in the execution of the protocol is interested in getting a
signature of all other parties on a known contract C. However, in contract
signing protocols the contract C to be signed is known to all parties before
the execution of contract signing protocol begins, while in nonrepudiation
protocols the text x is only known to party S before the execution of the
nonrepudiation protocol begins. Most contract signing protocols do make use
of a trusted third party. See for example [4, 5, 50], which introduce the problem
of contract signing, and present optimistic contract signing protocols.
Later, protocols were published to generalize from two-party to multi-
party contract signing protocols [7, 8, 42, 68]. These protocols were also op-
timistic, and they also made improvements in the number of steps required
to complete the execution of the protocol (see for example [7, 68]). Another
interesting contribution to the area of contract signing protocols was the devel-
opment of abuse-free contract signing protocols [22, 23]. In abuse-free contract
signing protocols no party can be in a state where it can prove to a third party
that it can choose to validate or invalidate the contract. Protocols which are
not abuse-free, can result in one party (say Bob) proving to a third party that
it is not yet committed to the contract but the other party (say Alice) is. Such
protocols are not desirable as they give Bob the incentive to use the willingness
of Alice to sign other contracts while never completing the contract signing
with Alice.
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The trusted third party in some of the published contract signing pro-
tocols is rather weak [11, 52]. For example, the trusted third party in Rabin’s
protocol [52] does not receive any messages from either of the two parties S
or R. Rather, Rabin’s third party periodically generates random numbers and
sends them to the original parties S and R.
Some published contract signing protocols do not employ a trusted third
party. See for example [12, 16]. However, the opportunism requirement that is
fulfilled by these protocols is weaker than our opportunism requirement which
is described in detail in Chapter 4. Our opportunism requirement requires that
as soon as a party recognizes that it has received its evidence it terminates. In
each of the protocols presented in [12, 16], a party (S or R) may continue to
execute the contract signing protocol even after this party recognizes that it
has collected all its needed evidence with the hope that the cost of processing
its collected evidence can be reduced dramatically.
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Chapter 3
Two-phase Nonrepudiation Protocols
The work that is presented in this chapter is based on the material pub-
lished in [2] 1. A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R performs
two tasks. First, the protocol enables party S to send to party R some text x
along with a proof (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed sent by S.
Second, the protocol enables party R to receive text x from S and to send to
S a proof (that can convince a judge) that x was indeed received by R. Only
one of two outcomes is possible when the execution of a nonrepudiation pro-
tocol from S to R terminates. The first outcome is that both S and R obtain
their required proofs. The second outcome is that neither S nor R obtains its
required proof.
Most nonrepudiation protocols that have been published in the litera-
ture seem to suffer from the following three problems:
• Execution of the protocol is non-deterministic. This implies that ex-
ecution of the protocol can follow anyone of several alternative paths.
For example, execution of the nonrepudiation protocol in [26] can follow
anyone of six alternative paths.
1Muqeet Ali, did ninety percent of the work in this paper
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• Some parties involved in the protocol need to utilize synchronized real-
time clocks. For example each of the three parties S, R, and T involved
in the nonrepudiation protocol in [26] needs to utilize real-time clocks.
Moreover, these three clocks need to be synchronized.
• Exchanged messages during execution of the protocol are of many dis-
tinct types. For example, there are nine distinct message types in the
multiparty protocol in [39].
These three problems seem to complicate the specification and verifica-
tion of nonrepudiation protocols. It is no accident that several nonrepudiation
protocols have been shown to be incorrect after they have been published in
the literature; see for example [24, 25, 28].
3.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we identify a rich class of nonrepudiation protocols,
called two-phase protocols, that do not suffer from the above three problems:
• Execution of a two-phase nonrepudiation protocol is deterministic and
so it is guaranteed to follow exactly one path.
• None of the parties involved in a two-phase protocol needs to utilize a
real-time clock. Therefore, proving correctness of two-phase protocols
does not require reasoning about real-time.
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• Exchanged messages during execution of a two-phase protocol are of two
types only.
Also in this chapter, we discuss how to specify and verify two-phase
protocols and demonstrate that the task of specifying and verifying a two-
phase protocol is simpler than the task of specifying and verifying a comparable
protocol that is not two-phase.
3.2 Two-phase Protocols
The objective that party S achieves by participating in the execution
of a nonrepudiation protocol from S to R is different from the objective that
party R achieves by participating in the execution of the same protocol. The
objective of party S is to obtain a proof that party R has received some text
x that was sent earlier from S to R. The objective of party R is to obtain a
proof that party S has sent some text x that was later received by R from S.
A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R is called two-phase
iff execution of the protocol by parties S and R proceeds in two phases. In
the first phase, the party (S or R) has not yet received its complete proof and
so it continues to execute the protocol as specified. In the second phase, the
party (S or R) has already received its complete proof and so it refrains from
sending any more messages specified by the protocol because these messages
only help the other party complete its proof. In other words, the two parties
S and R in any two-phase protocol will always act in their own self-interests
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during execution of the protocol.
Two-phase nonrepudiation protocols have the following advantages over
nonrepudiation protocols that are not two-phase:
(a) Execution of a two-phase protocol is inherently deterministic, whereas
execution of a protocol that is not two-phase is usually non-deterministic.
(b) The participating parties of a two-phase protocol do not need to have
synchronized clocks, whereas parties of a protocol that is not two-phase
need to have synchronized clocks.
(c) It follows from (a) and (b) above that specifying and verifying the cor-
rectness of a two-phase protocol are easier than specifying and verifying
the correctness of a comparable protocol that is not two-phase.
One more advantage of two-phase protocols is that the exchanged mes-
sages in these protocols are of two types only: send-proof messages and receive-
proof messages.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we
describe the (only) two types of messages that are exchanged during execu-
tions of two-phase protocols. Then in Section 3.4, we describe the syntax and
semantics of a simple notation that can be used for specifying two-phase pro-
tocols. In Section 3.5, we present a procedure for verifying the correctness
of two-phase protocols. In Section 3.6, we conclude that two-phase protocols
that involve only two parties, namely S and R, are incorrect, and we present
23
a (correct) two-phase protocol that involves three parties: S, R and a trusted
third party T .
In Section 3.7, we discuss the security analysis of our two-phase proto-
cols. In particular, we show that each one of these protocols can defend against
four types of attacks: malicious parties, message loss, collusion attacks, and
replay attacks. Concluding remarks of this chapter are given in Section 3.8.
3.3 Send and Receive Proof Messages
The messages exchanged during the executions of a two-phase protocol
are of two types: snd-proof messages and rcv-proof messages. In this section,
we describe these two types of messages.
A snd-proof message has five fields: message type, text, from, to, and
message signature. Consider for example the following snd-proof message:
(type: snd-proof,
text: x,
from: S,
to: R,
message signature: using the private key of S)
Because this message is signed using the private key of party S, only S could
have constructed this message. In fact party S has constructed this message
and sent it to party R in order to provide R with a proof that S is the one that
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sent text x to R. (This should explain why we call this message a snd-proof
message.)
At any point in the future, party R can show this snd-proof message to
an (impartial) judge and can get this judge to declare that party S has indeed
sent text x to party R and that party R has indeed received text x from party
S.
Like a snd-proof message, a rcv-proof message has five fields: message
type, text, from, to, and message signature. Consider for example the follow-
ing rcv-proof message:
(type: rcv-proof,
text: x,
from: S,
to: R,
message signature: using the private key of R)
Because this message is signed using the private key of party R, only R could
have constructed this message. In fact party R has constructed this message
and sent it to party S in order to provide S with a proof that R is the one
that received text x from S. (This should explain why we call this message a
rcv-proof message.)
At any point in the future, party S can show this rcv-proof message,
that it has received from party R, to an (impartial) judge and can get this
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judge to declare that party S has indeed sent text x to party R and that party
R has indeed received text x from party S.
From now on, each snd-proof message of the form: (type: snd-proof,
text: x, from: S, to: R, message signature: using the private key of S) is
written as:
snd-proof(x, S, R)
Also each rcv-proof message of the form: (type: rcv-proof, text: x,
from: S, to: R, message signature: using the private key of R) is written as:
rcv-proof(x, S, R)
3.4 Specification of Two-phase Protocols
In this section, we describe a simple notation for specifying two-phase
protocols that involve three parties S, R, and T . (The role of party T , which is
called a trusted third party, in two-phase protocols is discussed in Section 3.6
below.)
In our notation, each two-phase protocol is specified as a finite and
non-empty sequence of (atomic) steps, each of which is of the following form:
P → Q: msg.1, . . . , msg.k
P denotes a party out of the three parties S, R, and T .
Q denotes a party, different from party P , out of the three parties S, R, and
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T .
Each msg.i denotes either a snd-proof message or a rcv-proof message, as
defined in the previous section.
Informally, execution of this step consists of party P sending to party
Q the messages msg.1, . . . , msg.k, and of party Q receiving these messages.
(There are exceptions to this description; these are described below.)
Execution of a two-phase protocol consists of executing the steps of the
protocol, one by one, starting from its first step. Execution of the protocol
terminates when the last step in the protocol is executed or when any step in
the protocol is executed and its execution causes execution of the protocol to
terminate, as described below.
Associated with each two-phase protocol are three sets, called the S-
proof set, the R-proof set, and the T -proof set. The S-proof set contains
the snd-proof messages and rcv-proof messages that are received by party S
during execution of the protocol. Similarly, the R-proof set (or the T -proof set,
respectively) contains the snd-proof and rcv-proof messages that are received
by party R (or party T , respectively) during execution of the protocol.
Before execution of a two-phase protocol starts, the three proof sets of
the protocol are all empty. Then, as described below, executing each step adds
some messages to at most one of these three proof sets.
The S-proof set of a two-phase protocol is said to be complete at some
point during execution of the protocol iff the messages in the S-proof set at
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this point are sufficient to prove (to a judge) that text x has been received by
party R or by party T .
The R-proof set of a two-phase protocol is said to be complete at some
point during execution of the protocol iff the messages in the R-proof set at
this point are sufficient to prove (to a judge) that text x has been sent from
S to R.
Note that the concept of the T -proof set of a two-phase protocol being
complete is not defined.
Formally, the execution of a step
P → Q: msg.1, . . . , msg.k
in a two-phase protocol proceeds as follows
if P denotes party S
and-if the S-proof set of this protocol is complete before executing this step
then executing this step does not change any of the three proof sets but
causes execution of the protocol to terminate
else-if P denotes party R
and-if the R-proof set of this protocol is complete before executing this step
then executing this step does not change any of the three proof sets but
causes execution of the protocol to terminate
else executing this step adds the messages msg.1, . . . , msg.k to the Q-
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proof set of the protocol but does not change the other two proof sets
This formal definition of the execution of a step
P → Q: msg.1, . . . , msg.k
merits the following explanation.
Most of the time, execution of this step consists of party P sending the
messages msg.1, . . . , msg.k to party Q and of Q receiving these messages and
adding them to the Q-proof set of the protocol. Later, party Q can use these
messages in constructing its proof. There are two exceptions to this rule.
The first exception is when party P is in fact party S and the S-proof
set of the protocol is already complete. In this case, party S recognizes that
participating in the execution of this step does not help party S in constructing
its proof (since its proof is already complete). In this case, execution of this
step does not cause any of the messages msg.1, . . . , msg.k to be sent or received,
does not change any of the three proof sets of the protocol, but causes execution
of the protocol to terminate.
The second exception is when party P is in fact party R and the R-proof
set of the protocol is already complete. In this case, Party R recognizes that
participating in the execution of this step does not help party R in constructing
its proof (since its proof is already complete). In this case, execution of this
step does not cause any of the messages msg.1, . . . , msg.k to be sent or received,
does not change any of the three proof sets of the protocol, but causes execution
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of the protocol to terminate.
Note that there are two possible outcomes for the execution of a pro-
tocol step: either one or more messages are added to one of the three proof
sets of the protocol, or the three proof sets remain unchanged and execution
of the protocol terminates.
A two-phase protocol is correct iff the S-proof set and R-proof set of
the protocol are both complete when execution of the protocol terminates.
3.5 Verification of Two-phase Protocols
The procedure for verifying the correctness of a two-phase protocol
proceeds as follows:
1. Start with the three proof sets of the protocol (namely the S-proof set,
the R-proof set, and the T -proof set) being empty.
2. Trace the three proof sets as the protocol steps are executed one by one
starting with the first step in the protocol and until execution of the
protocol terminates. (Recall that execution of the protocol terminates
when the last step in the protocol is executed or when any protocol
step, whose execution causes execution of the protocol to terminate, is
executed.)
3. If both the S-proof set and R-proof set are complete when execution
of the protocol terminates, then the protocol is correct. Otherwise, the
protocol is incorrect.
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In the remainder of this section, we present a two-phase protocol and
use this verification procedure to show that this protocol is incorrect. Then,
in the rest of the chapter, we present three other two-phase protocols and use
this verification procedure to show that these protocols are all correct.
Two-phase Protocol 1:
Consider a two-phase protocol that consists of the following four steps.
S → R: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
S ← R: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
S → R: snd-proof(key, S, R)
S ← R: rcv-proof(key, S, R)
The text in the message of the first step (and of the second step) consists
of the “encryption” of text x using a “key” that only party S knows. The text
in the message of the third step (and of the fourth step) consists only of the
encryption “key”.
The S-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set contains
the two messages: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) and rcv-proof(key, S, R).
Also the R-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set contains the
two messages: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) and snd-proof(key, S, R).
To check whether this protocol is correct, we trace the three proof sets
of this protocol as the protocol steps are executed. This tracing leads to the
following proof sets after the four protocol steps are executed:
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S-proof = rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
R-proof = snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R),
snd-proof(key, S, R)
T -proof = empty set
At this point, execution of the protocol terminates and S-proof is not complete
but R-proof is complete. Because S-proof is not complete when execution of
the protocol terminates, the protocol is not correct.
3.6 A Two-phase Protocol with a Third Party T
The two-phase protocol 1 is incorrect as follows. In the last step of this
protocol, party R is supposed to send a message to party S. But the R-proof
set of the protocol becomes complete before executing this last step and the
message, that was supposed to be sent from R to S, is not sent. Thus, the
S-proof set of the protocol remains incomplete when execution of the protocol
terminates. This makes protocol 1 incorrect.
Theorem 3.1. There is no correct two-phase nonrepudiation protocol from
party S to party R that involves only parties S and R.
Proof. Assume that we can design a correct two-phase nonrepudiation proto-
col that involves only the two parties S and R. Also, assume that the last step
of this protocol is of the form:
R → S: msg.1,. . ., msg.k
Now, there are two cases to consider:
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Case 1: The R-proof set is not complete before executing this last step, then
the R-proof set will not be complete when execution of this last step termi-
nates, as execution of this last step will not change the R-proof set.
Case 2: The R-proof set is complete, then according to the specification of
two-phase nonrepudiation protocol, the execution of this step does not change
any proof set and causes execution of the protocol to terminate. We know
that both the S-proof set and the R-proof set cannot be complete before the
execution of this step. This is because if the S-proof set was complete before
execution of this last step, then it was also complete before the execution of
the previous step which was from S to R, and execution of that step would
have resulted in termination of the protocol. It follows that S-proof set of
the protocol was incomplete before execution of the last step, and will remain
incomplete after execution of the last step.
In the above two cases, either the S-proof set or R-proof set is not
complete when execution of the protocol terminates. This observation contra-
dicts the assumption that this protocol was a correct two-phase nonrepudiation
protocol.
A similar argument applies if the last step of the protocol is of the form:
S → R: msg.1,. . ., msg.k
This proves that there is no correct two-phase nonrepudiation protocol
from party S to party R that involves only parties S and R.
In the remainder of this chapter, we only consider two-phase protocols
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from S to R that involve three parties S, R and T . We assume that the third
party T is not biased to either of the two parties S or R. This means that
unlike the two parties S and R, which refrain from sending any message spec-
ified by the protocol when their respective proof sets are complete, party T
never refrains from sending any message specified by the protocol. (See the
definition of step execution in section 3.4 above.) Therefore, party T is often
referred to as a trusted third party [62]. A trusted third party T is involved
in each of the correct two-phase protocols discussed below.
Two-phase Protocol 2:
Consider a two-phase protocol that consists of the following three steps.
S → T : snd-proof(x, S, R)
S ← T : rcv-proof(x, S, T ), snd-proof(x, T , R)
R ← T : snd-proof(x, S, R)
In the first step, S sends a snd-proof(x, S, R) message to T which
turns around and forwards the message to R in the third step. This message
makes the R-proof set of the protocol complete. In the second step, T sends
two messages to S. The first message acknowledges that T has received text
x that was sent earlier by S and the second message promises that T will
forward text x to R. These two messages acknowledge that text x that was
sent earlier by S has been received or will shortly be received by R. These two
messages make the S-proof set of the protocol complete.
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It follows that the S-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set
contains the two messages: rcv-proof(x, S, T ) and snd-proof(x, T , R). The
R-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set contains the message
snd-proof(x, S, R).
To check that this protocol is correct, we trace the three proof sets
of this protocol as the protocol steps are executed. The tracing leads to the
following proof sets after the three protocol steps are executed:
S-proof = rcv-proof(x, S, T ), snd-proof(x, T , R)
R-proof = snd-proof(x, S, R)
T -proof = snd-proof(x, S, R)
At this point, both S-proof and R-proof are complete. Because both S-proof
and R-proof are complete when execution of the protocol terminates, the pro-
tocol is correct.
The two-phase protocol 2, though technically correct, has a problem. In
this protocol, party S never gives party R a chance to express its agreement to
participate in the protocol. Rather, party S starts by communicating directly
with party T in order to complete the S-proof set (without soliciting any
agreement from party R to participate in the protocol). Then party T turns
around to communicate with party R in order to complete the R-proof set. In
essence, party T “forces” party R to participate in the protocol.
To solve this problem, party S needs to start by communicating with
party R (to ensure that R agrees to participate in the protocol) before S com-
municates with party T . This protocol is discussed next.
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Two-phase Protocol 3:
Consider a two-phase protocol that consists of the following five steps.
S → R: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
S ← R: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
S → T : rcv-proof(encrypt(x,key),S,R),
snd-proof(key, S, R)
S ← T : rcv-proof(key, S, T )
R ← T : snd-proof(key, S, R)
In the first step, party S sends a snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
message to party R to allow R to agree to participate in the protocol. In
the second step, party R agrees to participate in the protocol by sending
back to party S a rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) message. This message
acknowledges that R has received an encryption of text x using a key that
only S knows. In the third step, S sends two messages to T . The first message
proves that party R has agreed to participate in the protocol, and the second
message carries the encryption key, which is to be forwarded from T to R in
the fifth step. In the fourth step, the message rcv-proof(key, S, T ) is sent from
T to S in order to acknowledge that T has received the key that was sent by
S in the third step.
It follows that the S-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set
contains the two messages: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) and rcv-proof(key,
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S, T ). The R-proof set of this protocol is complete when this set contains the
two messages: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) and snd-proof(key, S, R).
To check that this protocol is correct, we trace the three proof sets of
this protocol as the protocol steps are executed. This tracing leads to the
following proof sets after the five protocol steps are executed:
S-proof = rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R),
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
R-proof = snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R),
snd-proof(key, S, R)
T -proof = rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R),
snd-proof(key, S, R)
Because both S-proof and R-proof are complete when execution of the protocol
terminates (after executing the five protocol steps), the protocol is correct.
In verifying the correctness of the two-phase protocol 3, we assumed
that the three proof sets of this protocol are empty when execution of the
protocol starts. However, this assumption cannot be enforced (and in fact can
be violated) in practice.
For example, consider the case where this protocol is executed twice: In
the first execution, S sends encrypt(x1, key) and key to R, and in the second
execution, S sends encrypt(x2, key) and key to R. Note that S sends different
texts but sends the same key in these two executions.
After the first execution of this protocol terminates, the S-proof set
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and the R-proof set are as follows:
S-proof = rcv-proof(encrypt(x1, key), S, R),
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
R-proof = snd-proof(encrypt(x1, key), S, R),
snd-proof(key, S, R)
Assume that before the second execution of this protocol starts, the
S-proof set is allowed to keep the message rcv-proof(key, S, T ) and the R-
proof set becomes empty, as usual. Now, the second execution of the protocol
starts by S sending the message snd-proof(encrypt(x2, key), S, R) to R and
receiving back the message rcv-proof(encrypt(x2, key), S, R) from R. At this
point, the S-proof set and the R-proof set of the protocol become as follows:
S-proof = rcv-proof(key, S, T ),
rcv-proof(encrypt(x2, key), S, R)
R-proof = snd-proof(encrypt(x2, key), S, R)
Note that at this point, the S-proof set is complete but the R-proof
set is not. Thus, executing the third step of the protocol causes the second
execution of the protocol to terminate yielding a complete S-proof set and an
incomplete R-proof set. Therefore this protocol is incorrect.
The fact that this protocol is incorrect is caused by two factors. First,
when the second execution of the protocol starts, the S-proof set is allowed
to keep a message that was sent during the first execution of the protocol.
Second, S is allowed to use the same key in two distinct executions of the
protocol. Both these factors need to be allowed in order to make the protocol
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incorrect. Therefore, to make the protocol correct, we need to disallow either
one of these two factors. Next we describe how to design keys such that S is
compelled to use distinct keys in distinct executions of the protocol.
Consider any execution of two-phase protocol 3, where some text x is to
be sent from party S to party R via party T . In this execution of the protocol,
we require S to use a key that is the result of applying a secure hash function
H to the concatenation of four items: text x, identifier of party S, identifier
of party R, and identifier of party T . Thus,
key = H(text x | id of S | id of R | id of T )
where “|” denotes the concatenation operator. Note that this design of the
key ensures that S will generate distinct keys to be used in distinct execution
of the protocol.
In the third step of this protocol execution, S sends two messages rcv-
proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R) and snd-proof(key, S, R) to T . Then T performs
two checks to ensure that these messages are correct. First, T checks that the
key in the second message can indeed decrypt the encrypted text x in the first
message. Second, T checks that the key in the second message has the right
structure described above.
Next, we describe two-phase protocol 4, which enables party S to send
the same text x to n parties, denoted R.1, . . ., R.n, via trusted third party T .
Two-phase Protocol 4:
Consider the following two-phase multiparty protocol that consists of (3n +
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2) steps.
S → R.1: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.1)
· · ·
S → R.n: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.n)
S ← R.1: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.1)
· · ·
S ← R.n: rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.n)
S → T : rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.1),
snd-proof(key, S, R.1),
. . .
. . .
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.n),
snd-proof(key, S, R.n)
S ← T : rcv-proof(key, S, T )
R.1 ← T : snd-proof(key, S, R.1)
· · ·
R.n ← T : snd-proof(key, S, R.n)
Note that this protocol has (n+2) proof sets, namely S-proof, R.1-
proof, . . ., R.n-proof, and T -proof.
The S-proof set in this protocol is complete iff this set contains the
following (n + 1) messages:
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.1),
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. . .
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.n),
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
Also each R.i-proof set in this protocol is complete iff this set contains
the two messages: snd-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.i) and snd-proof(key, S,
R.i).
Also note that the key in this protocol is structured as follows:
key = H(text x | id of S | id of R.1 | . . . | id of R.n | id of T )
where “|” is the concatenation operator.
3.7 Security Analysis
In this section, we present a security analysis of two-phase protocol 3 in
this chapter. (A similar security analysis can also be presented for two-phase
protocol 4 in the chapter.) Protocol 3 is designed to defend against the four
security attacks: malicious parties, message loss, collusion attacks, and replay
attacks. Next, we describe these four attacks and show that protocol 3 can
succeed in defending against all four attacks.
3.7.1 Malicious Parties
By definition, the trusted third party T in protocol 3 is not malicious.
This means that party T sends every message that is supposed to send when
it is supposed to send it, as specified by the protocol.
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On the other hand, either one of the other two parties S and R can
be malicious. A malicious party can refrain from sending any message that
is supposed to send, as specified by protocol 3, in order to prevent this other
party from obtaining its complete proof. However, because the protocol is two-
phase, the malicious party cannot refrain from sending any message specified
by the protocol until this party has already obtained its own complete proof.
Referring to protocol 3, party S cannot refrain from sending the snd-
proof message in the first step and cannot refrain from sending the rcv-proof
and snd-proof messages in the third step because party S does not obtain its
complete proof until after the fourth step of the protocol. Similarly, party R
cannot refrain from sending the rcv-proof message in the second step of the
protocol because party R does not obtain its complete proof until after the
fifth step of the protocol.
It follows from this discussion that no party in protocol 3 can refrain
from sending any message that is supposed to send as specified by the protocol.
3.7.2 Message Loss
Any message that is supposed to be sent by one party and to be re-
ceived by another party during the execution of protocol 3 can be lost and not
received by the other party. There are two possible sources of message loss: an
unreliable communication medium between the two parties and maliciousness
of the sending party.
We assume that protocol 3 is to be executed on top of a reliable trans-
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port service (such as TCP in the internet). This transport service takes any
message that is sent by any party during the execution of protocol 3 and
transmits this message any number of times until the message is ultimately
received by its intended party. Therefore, message loss due to an unreliable
communication medium is not possible.
In Section 3.7.1 above, we argued that no party in protocol 3, whether
malicious or not, can refrain from sending any message that is supposed to send
as specified by the protocol. Therefore, message loss due to the maliciousness
of the sending party is also not possible.
3.7.3 Collusion Attacks
Consider an attack scenario where a party S executes protocol 3 to
send text x to a party R via a trusted party T . After executing protocol 3,
party S obtains its proof which consists of the following two messages:
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R)
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
Later party S forwards these two messages to a malicious party S
′
which
attempts to modify these messages in order to obtain a proof that party S
′
has sent text x to party R via a trusted party T .
However, any attempt of party S
′
to modify these two messages will
fail because the first message is signed by the private key of party R and the
second message is signed by the private key of the trusted party T and neither
S nor S
′
has access to these private keys.
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3.7.4 Replay Attacks
If party S is malicious, then it will use same key in two distinct execu-
tions of protocol 3. Note that if the same key is used in two distinct executions
of protocol 3, then some messages that have been generated and used as part
of the proofs of one execution can also be used as part of the proofs of a later
execution. Thus, these messages need not be generated in the second execution
of the protocol.
Assume for example that party S uses the same key in two distinct
executions of protocol 3. In the first execution of protocol 3, S uses key to
send text x to party R.1 via the trusted party T . In the second execution of
protocol 3, S uses the same key to send the same text x to another party R.2
via the trusted party T .
The proof that S needs to obtain in the first execution of protocol 3
consists of the two messages:
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.1)
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
Also the proof that S needs to obtain in the second execution of protocol 3
consists of the two messages:
rcv-proof(encrypt(x, key), S, R.2)
rcv-proof(key, S, T )
Therefore, party S obtains the message rcv-proof(key, S, T ) in the first exe-
cution of protocol 3 and does not need to obtain it in the second execution of
protocol 3. Thus, party S needs to execute only the first step of the protocol
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during its second execution of protocol 3.
To defend against this attack by a malicious party S, we prevent S from
choosing any key that it likes. Instead, we require that any key that party S
chooses to send text x to party R via a trusted party T should be the result
of applying a secure hash function H to the concatenation of four items: text
x, identifier of party S, identifier of party R, and identifier of party T :
key = H(text x | id of S | id of R | id of T )
In this case, the above attack cannot succeed because the key of the first
execution of protocol 3, say key.1, will be different from the key of the second
execution of protocol 3, say key.2:
key.1=H(text x | id of S | id of R.1 | id of T )
key.2=H(text x | id of S | id of R.2 | id of T )
3.8 Conclusion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we identified a rich class of nonrepudiation protocols
called two-phase protocols. We discussed how to specify and verify protocols
in this class and argued that the specification and verification of a two-phase
protocol are simpler than those of a comparable non-two-phase protocol. Our
argument is based on three observations. First, executions of two-phase proto-
cols are deterministic. Second, the parties involved in a two-phase protocol do
not need to utilize real-time clocks. Third, the messages exchanged in a two-
phase protocol need to be of only two types: snd-proof messages and rcv-proof
messages.
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The two two-phase protocols 3 and 4 are new. In particular, neither of
these protocols utilizes session labels that are distinct for distinct execution
sessions of the protocol. Instead, each of these two protocols requires the
encryption keys to have a special structure which allows these keys to be used
as distinct session labels for distinct execution sessions.
(With the notable exception of the non-two-phase protocol in [13] and [53],
most non-two-phase protocols utilize session labels that are distinct for distinct
execution sessions. Unfortunately, the non-two-phase protocol in [13] and [53]
is quite involved. For example, this protocol consists of three phases: main
protocol phase, abort phase, and recovery phase. Moreover, the exchanged
messages in this protocol are of eight types. And execution of this protocol is
highly non-deterministic.)
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Chapter 4
Nonrepudiation Protocols without a Trusted
Party
The material that is presented in this chapter is based on the paper [3]
1. In this chapter, we show that nonrepudiation protocols that do not involve
a third party can be designed under reasonable assumptions. Moreover, we
identify necessary and sufficient (reasonable) assumptions under which these
protocols can be designed. Finally, we present the first ever `-nonrepudiation
protocol that involves ` parties (none of which is trusted), where ` ≥ 2.
A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R performs two tasks.
First, the protocol enables party S to send to party R some text along with
sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that the text was indeed sent
by S to R. Second, the protocol enables party R to receive the sent text from
S and to send to S sufficient evidence (that can convince a judge) that the
text was indeed received by R from S.
Each nonrepudiation protocol is also required to fulfill the following op-
portunism requirement. During any execution of the nonrepudiation protocol
from S to R, once a party (S or R, respectively) recognizes that it has al-
1Muqeet Ali did ninety percent of the work presented in the paper
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ready collected all its needed evidence, then this party concludes that it gains
nothing by continuing to execute the protocol and so it terminates. The other
party (R or S, respectively) continues to execute the protocol with the hope
that it will eventually collect all its needed evidence.
The opportunism requirement which is satisfied by each party in a
nonrepudiation protocol can be thought of as a failure of that party. It is
important to contrast this failure model with the failure model used in the cel-
ebrated paper of Cleve [14]. Recall that Cleve’s paper states an impossibility
result regarding agreement on random bits chosen by two processes provided
that one of the processes is faulty. In Cleve’s paper the faulty process can fail
at any time during the execution of the protocol. Therefore, Cleve’s impossi-
bility result is not applicable in our case, as in our model, failures occur only
as dictated by the opportunism requirement.
The intuitive reasoning behind our failure model is that parties do
not wish to stop executing the protocol (and thus fail) before collecting their
needed evidence. Once a party recognizes that it has already collected all its
needed evidence, this party decides to stop executing the protocol (i.e., fail)
because it gains nothing by continuing to execute the protocol.
The opportunism requirement, that needs to be fulfilled by each nonre-
pudiation protocol, makes the task of designing nonrepudiation protocols very
hard. This is because once a party in a nonrepudiation protocol terminates
(because it has recognized that it has already collected all its needed evidence),
then from where will the other party continue to receive its needed evidence?
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The standard answer to this question is to assume that a nonrepudia-
tion protocol from party S to party R involves three parties: the two original
parties S and R and a third party T , which is often referred to as a trusted
party. Note that the objective of each original party is to collect its own ev-
idence, whereas the objective of the third party is to help the two original
parties collect their respective evidence. Therefore, the opportunism require-
ment for the third party T can be stated as follows. Once T recognizes that the
two original parties have already collected their evidence (or are guaranteed
to collect their evidence soon), T terminates.
An execution of a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that
involves the three parties S, R, and T can proceed in three steps as follows:
1. Party S sends some text to party T which forwards it to party R.
2. Party T computes sufficient evidence to establish that S has sent the
text to R then T forwards this evidence to R.
3. Party T computes sufficient evidence to establish that R has received
the text from S then T forwards this evidence to S.
Most nonrepudiation protocols that have been published in the literature in-
volve three parties: the two original parties and a third party [62]. A nonre-
pudiation protocol that does not involve a third party was published in [41].
We refer to this protocol as the MR protocol in reference to its two authors
Markowitch and Roggeman. Unfortunately, the correctness of this protocol is
questionable as discussed next.
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In the MR protocol, party S first sends to party R the text encrypted
using a symmetric key SK that only S knows. Then party S sends to party R
an arbitrary number of random numbers, each of which looks like, but in fact
is quite different from, the symmetric key SK. Finally, party S sends to party
R the symmetric key SK. After R receives each of these messages from S, R
sends to S an ack message that acknowledges receiving the message from S.
The evidence that R needs to collect is the first message (containing
the text encrypted using SK) and the last message (containing SK). The
evidence that S needs to collect is the acknowledgements of R receiving the
first and last messages.
In the MR protocol, when party R receives the i-th message from S,
where i is at least 2, R recognizes that the message content is either a random
number or the symmetric key SK. Thus, R can use the message content in
an attempt to decrypt the encrypted text (which R has received in the first
message). If this attempt fails, then R recognizes that the message content is
a random number and proceeds to send an ack message to S. If this attempt
succeeds, then R recognizes that the message content is the symmetric key SK
and terminates right away (in order to fulfill the opportunism requirement)
without sending the expected ack message to S. In this case, R succeeds
in collecting all the evidence that it needs while S fails in collecting all the
evidence that it needs.
To prevent this problematic scenario, the designers of the MR protocol
adopted the following three assumptions: (1) there is a lower bound lb on the
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time needed by R to decrypt the encrypted text, (2) S knows an upper bound
ub on the round trip delay from S to R and back to S, and (3) lb is larger than
ub. Based on these assumptions, if party S sends a random number to party
R and does not receive back the expected ack message for at least ub time
units, then S recognizes that R has tried to cheat (but failed) by attempting
to decrypt the encrypted text using the received random number. In this case,
party S aborts executing the protocol and both S and R fail to collect all
their needed evidence. Now, if party S sends a random number to party R
and receives back the expected ack message within ub time units, then both
parties continue to execute the protocol.
Unfortunately, party R can secretly decrease the value of lb, for exam-
ple by employing a super computer to decrypt the encrypted text, such that
assumption (3) above is violated. By violating assumption (3), the attempts
of R to cheat can go undetected by party S and the MR protocol can end up
in a compromised state where party R has terminated after collecting all its
needed evidence but party S is still waiting to collect its needed evidence that
will never arrive. This problematic scenario calls into question the correctness
of the MR protocol.
In this chapter, we discuss how to design nonrepudiation protocols that
do not involve a trusted party. We make the following five contributions:
1. We first state the round-trip assumption as follows: Party R knows an
upper bound on the round trip delay from R to S and back to R. Then
51
we show that adopting this assumption is both necessary and sufficient
for designing nonrepudiation protocols from S to R that do not involve
a third trusted party and where no sent message is lost.
2. Our sufficiency proof in 1 consists of designing the first (provably correct)
nonrepudiation protocol from S to R that does not involve a third party
and where no sent message is lost.
3. We state the bounded-loss assumption as follows: Party R knows an
upper bound on the number of messages that can be lost during any
execution of the protocol. Then we show that adopting both the round-
trip assumption and the bounded-loss assumption is both necessary and
sufficient in designing nonrepudiation protocols from S to R that do not
involve a third trusted party and where every sent message may be lost.
4. Our sufficiency proof in 3 consists of designing the first (provably correct)
nonrepudiation protocol from S to R that does not involve a third party
and where every sent message may be lost.
5. We extend the nonrepudiation protocol in 2 that involves only two par-
ties, S and R, into an `-nonrepudiation protocol that involves ` parties
(none of which is trusted), where ` ≥ 2.
4.1 Nonrepudiation protocols
In this section, we present our specification of a nonrepudiation protocol
that does not involve a third party. A nonrepudiation protocol from party S
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to party R that does not involve a third party is a communication protocol
between parties S and R that fulfills the following requirements.
(a). Message Loss: During each execution of the protocol, each message
that is sent by either party (S or R, respectively) is eventually received
by the other party (R or S, respectively).
(b). Message Alternation: During any execution of the protocol, the two
parties S and R exchange a sequence of messages. First, party S sends
msg.1 to party R. Then when party R receives msg.1, it sends back
msg.2 to party S, and so on. At the end when R receives msg.(r-1),
where r is an even integer whose value is at least 2, R sends back msg.r
to S. This exchange of messages can be represented as follows:
S → R: msg.1
S ← R: msg.2
· · ·
S → R: msg.(r-1)
S ← R: msg.r
(c). Message Signatures: Party S has a private key that only S knows
and the corresponding public key that all parties know. Party S uses its
private key to sign every message before sending this message to R so
that S can’t later repudiate that it has generated this message. Similarly,
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Party R has a private key that only R knows and the corresponding
public key that all parties know. Party R uses its private key to sign
every message before sending this message to S so that R can’t later
repudiate that it has generated this message.
(d). Collected Evidence: Both parties S and R collect evidence during
execution of the protocol. The evidence collected by party S is a subset
of those messages received by party S (from party R). Similarly, the
evidence collected by party R is a subset of those messages received by
party R (from party S).
(e). Guaranteed Termination: Every execution of the protocol is guar-
anteed to terminate in a finite time.
(f). Termination Requirement: Party S terminates only after S sends
some text to R and only after S receives from R sufficient evidence to
establish that R has indeed received the sent text from S. Similarly,
party R terminates only after R receives from S both the sent text and
sufficient evidence to establish that S has indeed sent this text to R.
(g). Opportunism Requirement: If during any execution of the protocol,
party S recognizes that it has already sent some text to R and has
later received from R sufficient evidence to establish that R has indeed
received this text, then S terminates. Similarly, if during any execution
of the protocol, party R recognizes that it has received from S some text
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and sufficient evidence to establish that S has indeed sent this text, then
R terminates.
(h). Judge: Anytime after execution of the nonrepudiation protocol termi-
nates, each of the two parties, S or R, can submit its collected evidence
to a judge that can decide whether the submitted evidence is valid and
should be accepted or it is invalid and should be rejected. The decision
of the judge is final and legally binding on both S and R. To help the
judge make the right decision, we assume that the judge knows the pub-
lic keys of S and R. We also assume that the judge has a public key
(that both S and R know) and a corresponding private key (that only
the judge knows).
(Note that the role of the judge is different than that of a trusted third
party. The trusted third party is used to generate and distribute the
needed evidence to the two parties, S and R. Therefore, the trusted
third party is directly involved during the execution of the nonrepudi-
ation protocol. The judge, however, is not directly involved during the
execution of the protocol, and it never generates nor distributes any
part of the needed evidence to either party. The judge only verifies the
submitted evidence after it has already been collected during execution
of the protocol. In fact every nonrepudiation protocol that has been
published in the past has both a trusted third party and a judge)
The opportunism requirement needs some explanation. Once party S recog-
nizes that it has already collected sufficient evidence to establish that party R
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has indeed received the text from S, S concludes that it gains nothing by con-
tinuing to participate in executing the protocol and so S terminates. (In this
case, only R may gain by continuing to participate in executing the protocol.)
Similarly, once party R recognizes that it has already collected sufficient
evidence to establish that party S has indeed sent the text to R, R concludes
that it gains nothing by continuing to participate in executing the protocol
and so R terminates.
Next, we state a condition, named the round-trip assumption and show
in the next section that adopting this assumption is both necessary and suffi-
cient to design nonrepudiation protocols from party S to party R that do not
involve a third party.
Round-Trip Assumption: Party R knows an upper bound t (in time
units) on the round trip delay from R to S and back to R
4.2 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonrepudi-
ation Protocols
We prove that it is necessary to adopt the round-trip assumption when
designing nonrepudiation protocols from party S to party R that do not involve
a third party.
Theorem 4.1. In designing a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party
R, that does not involve a third party, it is necessary to adopt the round-trip
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assumption.
Proof. Consider an execution of a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to
party R that does not involve a third party. This execution fulfills the eight
requirements that are listed in Section 4.1, namely message loss, message al-
ternation, message signature, collected evidence, guaranteed termination, ter-
mination requirement, opportunism requirement, and judge.
From the message alternation requirement, the exchanged messages
during this execution of the protocol can be represented as follows:
S → R : msg.1
S ← R : msg.2
· · ·
S → R: msg.(r-1)
S ← R: msg.r
During this execution of the protocol, when party S receives a msg.i from
party R, then by the collected evidence requirement, party S may recognize
that msg.i is part of its evidence that needs to be collected and add msg.i to its
set of collected evidence. Then party S examines its set of collected evidence
and reaches one of two conclusions: either the set of collected evidence is not
yet sufficient to establish that R has indeed received the sent text from S, or
the set of collected evidence is already sufficient to establish that R has indeed
received the sent text from S.
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If party S reaches the first conclusion, then S recognizes by the termi-
nation requirement that it needs to receive at least one more message from R,
and so S goes ahead and sends msg.(i+1) to R then waits to receive msg.(i+2)
from R.
On the other hand, if party S reaches the second conclusion, then S
recognizes by the opportunism requirement that it needs to terminate. In
this case, if R knows no upper bound (in time units) on the round trip delay
from R to S and back to R, then R will continue to wait indefinitely for the
next message, namely msg.(i+1), which will never arrive, contradicting the
guaranteed termination requirement. (Note that if R knows an upper bound
t on the round trip delay from R to S and back to R, then R will wait t time
units for msg.(i+1) before recognizing that there is no msg.(i+1) and that
the current set of evidence collected by R is sufficient to establish that S has
indeed sent the text to R.)
Thus, if party S ever reaches the second conclusion when S receives a
msg.i from R, then R needs to know an upper bound on the round trip delay
from R to S and back to R (in order to avoid contradicting the guaranteed
termination requirement). In fact, party S is guaranteed to reach this second
conclusion when S receives the last message, namely msg.r, from R. Therefore,
the round-trip assumption needs to be adopted during any execution of the
protocol.
Next, we prove that it is sufficient to adopt the round-trip assumption
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in order to design a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that
does not involve a third party.
Theorem 4.2. It is sufficient to adopt the round-trip assumption in order to
design a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that does not involve
a third party.
Proof. We present a design of a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party
R that does not involve a third party and show that correctness of this proto-
col is based on adopting the round-trip assumption. Our presentation of this
protocol consists of four steps. In each step, we start with a version of the
protocol then show that this version is incorrect (by showing that it violates
one of the requirements in Section 4.1). We then proceed to modify this pro-
tocol version in an attempt to make it correct. After four steps, we end up
with a correct nonrepudiation protocol (that satisfies all eight requirements in
Section 4.1).
First Protocol Version: In this protocol version, party S sends a txt mes-
sage to party R which replies by sending back an ack message. The exchange
of messages in this protocol version can be represented as follows.
S → R: txt
S ← R: ack
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The txt message contains: (1) the message sender S and receiver R, (2) the
text that S needs to send to R, and (3) signature of the message using the
private key of the message sender S. Similarly, the ack message contains: (1)
the message sender R and receiver S, (2) the text that S needs to send to R,
and (3) signature of the message using the private key of the message sender
R.
The txt message is the evidence that R needs to collect and can later
present to the judge to get the judge to declare that the text in the message
was indeed sent by S to R. Similarly, the ack message is the evidence that S
needs to collect and can later present to the judge to get the judge to declare
that the text in the message was indeed received by R from S.
This protocol version is incorrect for the following reason. When R
receives the txt message, it recognizes that it has already collected sufficient
evidence to establish that S has indeed sent the text to R and so R terminates,
by the opportunism requirement, before it sends the ack message to S. Party S
ends up waiting indefinitely for the ack message that will never arrive violating
the guaranteed termination requirement.
To make this protocol version correct, we need to devise a technique by
which R does not recognize that it has collected sufficient evidence to establish
that S has indeed sent the text to R, even after R has collected such evidence.
Second Protocol Version: In this protocol version, party S sends n txt
messages to party R, where n is a positive integer selected at random by S
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and is kept as a secret from R. The exchange of messages in this protocol
version can be represented as follows.
S → R : txt.1
S ← R : ack.1
· · ·
S → R: txt.n
S ← R: ack.n
Each txt.i message contains: (1) the message sender S and receiver R, (2)
the text that S needs to send to R, (3) the sequence number of the message i,
and (4) signature of the message using the private key of the message sender
S. Similarly, each ack.i message contains: (1) the message sender R and re-
ceiver S, (2) the text that S needs to send to R, (3) the sequence number of
the message i, and (4) signature of the message using the private key of the
message sender R.
The txt.n message is the evidence that R needs to collect and can later
present to the judge to get the judge to declare that the text in the message
was indeed sent by S to R. Similarly, the ack.n message is the evidence that S
needs to collect and can later present to the judge to get the judge to declare
that the text in the message was indeed received by R from S.
When R receives the txt.n message from S, then (because R does not
know the value of n) R does not recognize that it has just received sufficient
61
evidence to establish that S has indeed sent the text to R. Thus, R does not
terminate and instead proceeds to send the ack.n message to S.
When S receives the ack.n message from R, then (because S knows
the value of n) S recognizes that it has just received sufficient evidence to
establish that R has received the text sent from S to R. Thus, by the oppor-
tunism requirement, S terminates and R ends up waiting indefinitely for the
txt.(n+1) message that will never arrive violating the guaranteed termination
requirement.
This protocol version is incorrect. To make it correct, we need to de-
vise a technique by which party R recognizes, after S terminates, that R has
already collected sufficient evidence to establish that S has indeed sent the
text to R.
Third Protocol Version: This protocol version is designed by modifying
the second protocol version (discussed above) taking into account the adopted
round-trip assumption, namely that R knows an upper bound t (in time units)
on the round trip delay from R to S and back to R.
The exchange of messages in the third protocol version is the same as
that in the second protocol version. However, in the third protocol version,
every time R sends an ack.i message to S, R activates a time-out to expire
after t time units.
If R receives the next txt.(i+1) before the activated time-out expires,
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then R cancels the timeout. If the activated time-out expires before R re-
ceives the next txt.(i+1) message, then R recognizes that the last received
txt.i message is in fact the txt.n message and so R recognizes that it has al-
ready collected sufficient evidence to establish that S has already sent the text
to R and so R terminates (by the opportunism requirement). Execution of
this protocol version can be represented as follows:
S → R: txt.1
S ← R: ack.1; R activates time-out
S → R: txt.2; R cancels time-out
· · ·
S → R: txt.n; R cancels time-out
S ← R: ack.n; R activates time-out; S terminates
time-out expires; R terminates
This protocol version still has a problem. After execution of the protocol
terminates, party R may decide to submit its collected evidence, namely the
txt.n message, to the judge so that the judge can certify that S has indeed
sent the text in the txt.n message. The judge can make this certification if it
observes that the sequence number of the txt.n message equals the random in-
teger n that S selected when execution of the protocol started. Unfortunately,
the value of n is not included in the txt.n message.
Similarly, after execution of the protocol terminates, party S may de-
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cide to submit its collected evidence, namely the ack.n message, to the judge
so that the judge can certify that R has indeed received the text in the ack.n
message. The judge can make this certification if it observes that the sequence
number of the ack.n message equals the random integer n that S selected when
execution of the protocol started. Unfortunately, the value of n is not included
in the ack.n message.
To solve these two problems, we need to devise a technique by which
the value of n is included in every txt.i message and every ack.i message such
that the following two conditions hold. First, the judge can extract the value
of n from any txt.i or ack.i message. Second, party R can’t extract the value
of n from any txt.i message nor from any ack.i message.
Fourth Protocol Version: In this protocol version, two more fields are
added to each txt.i message and each ack.i message. The first field stores the
encryption of n using a symmetric key KE that is generated by party S and
is kept as a secret from party R. The second field stores the encryption of the
symmetric key KE using the public key of the judge.
These two fields are computed by party S when execution of the pro-
tocol starts and are included in every txt.i message before this message is sent
from S to R. When party R receives a txt.i message from party S, party
R copies these two fields from the received txt.i message into the next ack.i
message before this message is sent from R to S.
After execution of this protocol version terminates, party S can submit
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its collected evidence, namely the last ack.i message that S has received from
R, to the judge so that the judge can examine the ack.i message and certify
that R has received the text in this message from S. The judge makes this
certification by checking, among other things, that the sequence number i of
the ack.i message is greater than or equal to n. The judge then forwards its
certification to party S.
Similarly, after execution of this protocol version terminates, party R
can submit its collected evidence, namely the last txt.i message that R has
received from S, to the judge so that the judge can examine the txt.i message
and certify that S has sent the text in this message to R. The judge makes
this certification by checking, among other things, that the sequence number
i of the txt.i message is greater than or equal to n. The judge then forwards
its certification to party R.
Note that the judge can certify at most one ack.i message from party
S, and at most one txt.i message from party R. This restriction forces S to
send to the judge only the last ack.i message that S has received from R. This
restriction also forces R to send to the judge only the last txt.i message that
R has received from S.
4.3 Nonrepudiation Protocols with Message Loss
In the remainder of this chapter, we consider a richer class of nonre-
pudiation protocols where sent messages may be lost before they are received.
Each protocol in this class is required to fulfill the following requirements.
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(a). Message Loss: During each execution of the protocol, each message
that is sent by either party (S or R, respectively) can be lost before it
is received by the other party (R or S, respectively).
(b). Message Alternation: During any execution of the protocol where no
sent message is lost, the two parties S and R exchange a sequence of
messages. First, party S sends msg.1 to party R. Then when party R
receives msg.1, it sends back msg.2 to party S, and so on. At the end
when R receives msg.(r-1), where r is an even integer whose value is at
least 2, R sends back msg.r to S. This exchange of messages can be
represented as follows:
S → R: msg.1
S ← R: msg.2
· · ·
S → R: msg.(r-1)
S ← R: msg.r
(c). Message Signatures: This requirement is the same as the message
signature requirement in Section 4.1.
(d). Collected Evidence: This requirement is the same as the collected
evidence requirement in Section 4.1.
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(e). Guaranteed Termination: This requirement is the same as the guar-
anteed termination requirement in Section 4.1.
(f). Termination Requirement: This requirement is the same as the ter-
mination requirement in Section 4.1.
(g). Opportunism Requirement: This requirement is the same as the
opportunism requirement in Section 4.1.
(h). Judge: This requirement is the same as the requirement of the judge in
Section 4.1.
Next, we state a condition, named the bounded-loss assumption. We then show
in the next section that adopting this assumption along with the round-trip
assumption (stated in Section 4.1) is both necessary and sufficient to design
nonrepudiation protocols from party S to Party R that do not involve a third
party and where sent messages can be lost.
Bounded-Loss Assumption: Party R knows an upper bound K on the
number of messages that can be lost during any execution of the nonrepudia-
tion protocols
4.4 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Nonrepudi-
ation Protocols with Message Loss
We prove that it is necessary to adopt both the round-trip assumption
and the bounded-loss assumption when designing nonrepudiation protocols
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from party S to party R that do not involve a third party and where sent
messages may be lost.
Theorem 4.3. In designing a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party
R that does not involve a third party and where sent messages may be lost, it
is necessary to adopt the round-trip assumption.
Proof. Consider a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that does
not involve a third party and where sent messages may be lost. Consider an
execution of this protocol where no message is lost. This execution fulfills the
eight requirements that are listed in Section 4.4, namely message loss, message
alternation, message signature, collected evidence, guaranteed termination,
termination requirement, opportunism requirement, and judge.
From the message alternation requirement, the exchanged messages
during this execution of the protocol can be represented as follows:
S → R: msg.1
S ← R: msg.2
· · ·
S → R: msg.(r-1)
S ← R: msg.r
This execution of the nonrepudiation protocol with message loss is the
same as the execution in the proof of Theorem 4.1, which states that in design-
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ing a nonrepudiation protocol (with no message loss) from party S to party
R, that does not involve a third party, it is necessary to adopt the round-trip
assumption. As the execution of the nonrepudiation protocol discussed in this
proof is the same as in Theorem 4.1, the proof of this theorem follows from
the reasoning given in Theorem 4.1. Therefore, it is necessary to adopt the
round-trip assumption in designing a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to
party R that does not involve a third party and where sent messages may be
lost.
Theorem 4.4. In designing a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party
R that does not involve a third party and where sent messages may be lost, it
is necessary to adopt the bounded-loss assumption.
Proof. Consider a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that does
not involve a third party and where sent messages may be lost. Also consider
an execution of this protocol where only msg.r is sent and lost several times.
(Recall that from Theoem 4.3, party R knows an upper bound t in time units
on the round trip delay from R to S and back to R.)
From the message alternation requirement, the exchanged messages
during this execution of the protocol can be represented as follows:
S → R: msg.1
S ← R: msg.2
· · ·
69
S → R: msg.(r-1)
S ← R: msg.r
S ← R: msg.r (after R waits for but does not receive msg.(r+1) for t
time units)
S ← R: msg.r (after R waits for but does not receive msg.(r+1) for t
time units)
During this execution of the protocol, when party S receives msg.i from
party R, then by the collected evidence requirement, party S may decide to
add msg.i to its set of collected evidence. Then party S examines its set
of collected evidence and reaches one of two conclusions: either the set of
collected evidence is not yet sufficient to establish that R has indeed received
the sent text from S, or the set of collected evidence is already sufficient to
establish that R has indeed received the sent text from S.
If party S reaches the first conclusion, then S recognizes by the termi-
nation requirement that it needs to receive at least one more message from R,
and so S goes ahead and sends msg.(i+1) to R then waits to receive msg.(i+2)
from R.
If party S reaches the second conclusion, then S recognizes by the
opportunism requirement that the value of i is in fact r and so S terminates
while R continues to wait for msg.(i+1) that will never arrive. After waiting
for t time units without receiving msg.(i+1), R recognizes that either msg.i or
msg.(i+1) was lost and so R times-out, resends msg.i to S, and continues to
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wait to receive msg.(i+1) that will never arrive, and the cycle repeats. There
are two cases to be considered.
In the first case, R knows no upper bound on the number of messages
that can be lost during any execution of the protocol. In this case, R will
continue to execute the following two steps indefinitely: First, R waits for t
time units to receive msg.(r+1) that will never arrive. Second, R times-out
after t time units and resends msg.r. In this case R never terminates which
contradicts the guaranteed termination requirement.
In the second case, R knows an upper bound K on the number of
messages that can be lost during any execution. In this case, R executes the
above two steps K times only then recognizes that its current set of collected
evidence is sufficient to establish that S has indeed sent the text to R and so
R terminates by the opportunism requirement.
This discussion necessitates that R knows an upper bound K on the
number of messages that can be lost during any execution of the protocol.
Therefore, the bounded-loss assumption needs to be adopted during any exe-
cution of the protocol
Next, we prove that it is sufficient to adopt both the round-trip as-
sumption and the bounded-loss assumption in order to design a nonrepudia-
tion protocol from party S to party R that does not involve a third party and
where sent messages may be lost.
71
Theorem 4.5. It is sufficient to adopt both the round-trip assumption and
the bounded-loss assumption in order to design a nonrepudiation protocol from
party S to party R that does not involve a third party and where sent messages
may be lost.
Proof. In our proof of Theorem 4.2, we adopted the round-trip assumption
in order to design a nonrepudiation protocol, which we refer to in this proof
as protocol P , from party S to party R that does not involve a third party
and where no sent message is ever lost. In the current proof, we adopt the
bounded-loss assumption in order to modify protocol P into protocol Q, which
is a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that does not involve a
third party and where sent messages may be lost.
In protocol P , every time party R sends an ack.i message to party S,
R activates a time-out to expire after t time units, where (by the round-trip
assumption) t is an upper bound on the round trip delay from R to S and
back to R. Because no sent message is ever lost in protocol P , then if the
activated time-out expires before R receives the next txt.(i+1) message from
S, R concludes that S has already terminated, the next txt.(i+1) message
will never arrive, and R has already collected sufficient evidence to establish
that S has sent the text to R. In this case, R also terminates fulfilling the
opportunism requirement.
In protocol Q, every time party R sends an ack.i message to party S, R
activates a time-out to expire after t time units. However, because every sent
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message in protocol Q may be lost, if the activated time-out expires before R
receives the next txt.(i+1) message from S, then R concludes that either the
ack.i message or the txt.(i+1) message is lost, and in this case R sends the
ack.i message once more to S and activates a new time-out to expire after t
time units, and the cycle repeats.
By the bounded-loss assumption, R knows an upper bound K on the
number of messages that can be lost during any execution of protocol Q.
Therefore, the cycle of R sending an ack.i message then the activated time-
out expiring after t time units can be repeated at most K times.
If the activated time-out expires for the (K+1)-th time, then R con-
cludes that S has already terminated, the next txt.(i+1) message will never
arrive, and R has already collected sufficient evidence to establish that S has
sent the text to R. In this case, R terminates fulfilling the opportunism re-
quirement.
4.5 An `-Nonrepudiation Protocol
In the Proof of Theorem 4.2, we presented a nonrepudiation protocol
from party S to party R that does not involve a trusted party and where no
sent message is lost. In this section, we discuss how to extend this protocol
to a nonrepudiation protocol that involves ` parties, namely P1, · · · , P`, and
satisfies three conditions: (1) ` ≥ 2, (2) none of the involved parties in the
protocol is a trusted party, and (3) no sent message during any execution of
the protocol is lost. We refer to this extended protocol as an `-nonrepudiation
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protocol.
The objectives of an `-nonrepudiation protocol are as follows. For each
two parties in the protocol, say Pi and Pj, the protocol achieves two objec-
tives:
1. One of the two parties, say Pi, is enabled to send the text to the other
party Pj and to receive from Pj sufficient evidence that can convince a
judge that Pj has indeed received the text from Pi.
2. The other party Pj is enabled to receive the text from Pi and to receive
sufficient evidence from Pi that can convince a judge that Pi has indeed
sent the text to Pj.
Therefore, each party Pi ends up collecting sufficient evidence from every other
party Pj indicating that either Pj has indeed received the text from Pi or Pj
has indeed sent the text to Pi.
Before we describe our `-nonrepudiation protocol, as an extension of the
2-nonrepudiation protocol in the proof of Theorem 4.2, we need to introduce
two useful concepts: parent and child of a party Pi. Each of the parties P1,
· · · , P (i− 1) is called a parent of party Pi. Also each of the parties P (i+ 1),
· · · , P` is called a child of party Pi. Note that party P1 has no parents and
parent P` has no children. Note also that the number of parents plus the
number of children for each party is (`-1).
Execution of our `-nonrepudiation protocol proceeds as follows:
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1. Party P1 starts by sending a txt.1 message to each one of its children.
2. When a party Pi, where i 6= 1 and i 6= `, receives a txt.1 message from
each one of its parents, party Pi sends a txt.1 message to each one of its
children.
3. When party P` receives a txt.1 message from each one of its parents,
party P` sends back an ack.1 message to each one of its parents.
4. When a party Pi, where i 6= 1 and i 6= `, receives an ack.1 message from
each one of its children, party Pi sends an ack.1 message to each one of
its parents.
5. When party P1 receives an ack.1 message from each one of its children,
party P1 sends a txt.2 message to each one of its children, and the cycle
consisting of Steps 2, 3, 4, and 5 is repeated n times until P1 receives
an ack.n message from each one of its children. In this case, party P1
collects as evidence the ack.n messages that P1 has received from all its
children, then P1 terminates.
6. Each party Pi, where i 6= 1, waits to receive a txt.(n+1) message (that
will never arrive) from each one of its parents, then times out after (i-
1)*T time units, collects as evidence the txt.n messages that Pi has
received from all its parents and the ack.n messages that Pi has received
from all its children, then Pi terminates.
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Note that T is an upper bound on the round trip delay from any party Pi to
any other party Pj and back to Pi. It is assumed that each party, other than
P1, knows this upper bound T .
4.6 Conclusion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we address several problems concerning the design of
nonrepudiation protocols from a party S to a party R that do not involve a
trusted third party. In such a protocol, S sends to R some text x along with
sufficient evidence to establish that S is the party that sent x to R, and R
sends to S sufficient evidence that R is the party that received x from S.
Designing such a protocol is not an easy task because the protocol is re-
quired to fulfill the following opportunism requirement. During any execution
of the protocol, once a party recognizes that it has received its sufficient evi-
dence from the other party, this party terminates right away without sending
any message to the other party. In this case, the other party needs to obtain
its evidence without the help of the first party. (To fulfill this opportunism
requirement, most published nonrepudiation protocols involve a trusted third
party T so that when one of the two original parties recognizes that it has
already received its sufficient evidence and terminates, the other party can
still receive its evidence from T .)
Our main result in this chapter is the identification of two simple con-
ditions that are both necessary and sufficient for designing nonrepudiation
protocols that do not involve a trusted third party. .
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In proving that these two conditions are sufficient for designing nonre-
pudiation protocols, we presented an elegant nonrepudiation protocol that is
based on the following novel idea. By the time party S recognizes that it has
received its evidence, party S has already sent to R its evidence, but R has not
yet recognized that it has received all its evidence. In this case, S terminates
as dictated by the opportunism requirement but R continues to wait for the
rest of its evidence from S. Eventually R times-out and recognizes that S will
not send any more evidence. This can only mean that party S has terminated
after it has already sent all the evidence to R. Thus, R terminates as dictated
by the opportunism requirement.
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Chapter 5
Nonrepudiation Protocols in Cloud Systems
In this chapter, we present a nonrepudiation protocol from party S
to party R that transfers a file F from party S to party R such that all
communications between parties S and R are carried out through a cloud C.
A nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party R that is implemented in
cloud C ensures that party S gets a proof that a file F was indeed received
by party R from party S. It also ensures that party R receives both the file
F and the proof that the file F was indeed sent by party S to party R.
In previous nonrepudiation protocols, parties S and R could commu-
nicate directly with each other. In this chapter, we introduce nonrepudiation
protocols in which the communication is carried out only through a cloud C.
This different mode of communication leads us to design a new nonrepudiation
protocol from S to R over a cloud C. Throughout this chapter we will assume
that the cloud C serves as a permanent storage for the items stored in it, i.e.
we assume that cloud C is able to store the file F and the needed proofs by
the two parties S and R permanently. Once the file F and two proofs are
stored on the cloud C, they can be received at any later time by any of the
two parties S and R. Therefore, party S or party R need not store the file F
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and the needed proofs in their local storage. These parties can receive these
items from the cloud C whenever needed.
In this chapter, we describe the details of the nonrepudiation protocol
from party S to party R that is implemented in cloud systems. In Section 5.1,
we will present an overview of the protocol. In Section 5.2, we will present the
specification of the protocol, and Section 5.3 includes the verification of the
proposed protocol. We present the advantages of the protocol in Section 5.4,
and conclude in Section 5.5.
5.1 Protocol Overview
The protocol involves three parties: party S, party R, and party C.
The protocol enables the transfer of a file F from party S to party R such
that all communications are carried out through a cloud C. The protocol will
enable party S to send to party R the file F and a proof that the file F was
indeed sent by S to R. It also enables party R to receive file F from party S
and to send to S a proof that file F was indeed received by R from S. Since
all the communications are carried out through a cloud C, it is convenient to
replace the proof that file F was sent by party S to party R by the following
two proofs:
Proof1 is a proof that file F was sent by sender S to cloud C
Proof2 is a proof that F was received by cloud C from sender S,
and was later sent from C to receiver R
Proof1 and Proof2 together form the proof that file F was sent by party S to
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party R.
Similarly, the proof that file F was received by party R from party S
can be replaced by the following two proofs:
Proof2 is a proof that F was received by cloud C from sender S,
and was later sent from C to receiver R
Proof3 is a proof that F was received by receiver R from cloud C
Proof2 and Proof3 together form the proof that file F was indeed received by
party R from party S.
The nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over a cloud C operates in
two modes. Next, we give an overview of these two modes of the protocol. The
first mode of the protocol has three steps. In the first step, party S sends the
file F alongwith Proof1 to party C. In the second step, party C sends Proof2
to party R which serves as an announcement that party C received file F from
party S. In the third step, party R sends Proof3 to party C which serves as
an acknowledgement of the announcement. At the end of this mode of the
protocol, party C ends up storing the file F , and the three proofs: Proof1,
Proof2, and Proof3.
In the second mode, party R asks for the file F and its needed proofs
from party C, and after party C receives this request from R, party C sends
the file F along with Proof1 and Proof2 to party R. Similarly, in the second
mode, party S asks for the file F and its needed proofs from party C, after
party C receives this request from S, party C sends the file F along with
Proof2 and Proof3 to party S
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It is noteworthy to mention that the first mode of the protocol is ex-
ecuted only once, but the second mode of the protocol can be executed any
number of times. Whenever a party S or R wants to receive the file F and
its needed proofs, it can execute the second mode of the protocol. Since the
cloud stores the file F and the three proofs permanently, therefore the cloud
C can always send both the file F and the needed proofs to each of the two
parties S and R.
5.2 Protocol Specification
We assume that each party (i.e., party C, party S, and party R) has
a private and public key. Each party knows its private and public keys, and
knows the public keys of all other parties. In this section we will describe
the steps of the protocol, and the proofs mentioned in the previous section in
greater detail. The Proof1 which is a proof that F was sent by party S to
party C can be represented as follows:
Proof1: (S,C,R,H(F ),signature by S)
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is a hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of S is computed on the tuple (S,C,R,H(F )) using the
private key of S
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Proof2 which is a proof that file F was received by C from S, and was
later sent by C to R can be represented as follows:
Proof2: (S,C,R,H(F ),signature by C)
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is a hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of C is computed on the tuple (S,C,R,H(F )) using the
private key of C
Proof3 which is a proof that file F was received by party R from party
C can be represented as follows:
Proof3: (S,C,R,H(F ),signature by R)
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is a hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of R is computed on the tuple (S,C,R,H(F )) using the
private key of R
82
Next we describe the two modes of the protocol. The first mode has
three steps which are described below:
1. Store-File Step: In this step, party S sends a file F along with
Proof1 to party C. This step can be represented as:
S → C: (F , Proof1)
2. Announce-File Step: In this step, party C announces to party R
that it has received file F from party S. This step can be represented
as:
R ← C: (Proof2)
3. Announcement-Received Step: In this step party R sends Proof3
to party C which proves to party C that R has received the announce-
ment sent in the Announce-File Step. This step is represented as:
R → C: (Proof3)
At the end of the execution of the first mode of the protocol, party C
ends up with the following five data items:
F
H(F )
Proof1
Proof2
Proof3
These five data items are stored permanently by the cloud C. On the other
hand each of the two parties S and R end up with only one item, namely
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H(F ).
Next, we describe the second mode of the protocol:
In this mode,party R asks for the file F whose hash is H(F ) and the
two associated proofs Proof1 and Proof2 from party C. After party C
receives this request from party R, it sends to party R the file F and its
two needed proofs . This step is represented as follows:
R → C: send me file F whose hash is H(F ) and the two
associated proofs, Proof1 and Proof2
R ← C: (F ,Proof1,Proof2)
Also in the second mode,party S asks for the file F whose hash is H(F )
and the two associated proofs Proof2 and Proof3 from party C. After
party C receives this request from party S, it sends to party S the file
F and its two needed proofs . This step is represented as follows:
S → C: send me file F whose hash is H(F ) and the two
associated proofs, Proof2 and Proof3
S ← C: (F ,Proof2,Proof3)
At the end of the execution of the second mode of the protocol, party
R ends up with file F and the two proofs: Proof1 and Proof2, which together
form the proof that file F was sent by party S to party R. Similarly, party
S ends up with file F and the two proofs: Proof2 and Proof3, which together
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form the proof that file F was indeed received by party R from party S. The
second mode of the protocol can be executed any number of times by either
of the two parties S and R as the cloud C is able to store the file F and the
three proofs permanently.
5.3 Protocol Verification
In this section, we verify the correctness of the nonrepudiation protocol
presented in the previous section. We execute the two modes of the protocol.
After the execution of the second mode of the protocol, we show that each
party ends up with both the file F and its needed proofs. Below we execute
the steps of the first mode of the protocol.
After the execution of the first step, party S stores H(F ) and party C
stores H(F ), F and Proof1.
After the execution of the second step, party R stores H(F ), and party
C stores Proof2
After the execution of the third step, party C stores Proof3
At the end of the execution of the above three steps, party S ends up
storing H(F ), party R ends up storing H(F ), and party C ends up storing
the five data items: H(F ), F , Proof1, Proof2, and Proof3. This means party
C ends up storing the file F and all the proofs.
After the execution of the second mode of the protocol, party R ends up with
file F and two proofs Proof1 and Proof2. Also, party S ends up with file F
and the two proofs Proof2 and Proof3.
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In this way after the end of the execution of the two modes of the
protocol. Party S ends up with the file F and the proof that file F was indeed
received by R from S. Also, party R ends up with file F and the proof that
file F was indeed sent by S to R.
5.4 Protocol Advantages
In this section, we describe the advantage of nonrepudiation protocols
in cloud systems as compared to nonrepudiation protocols that are not imple-
mented in cloud systems. In previous nonrepudiation protocols, a party (S or
R) needed to store both the file F and its needed proof. For example, party S
needed to store both the file F and the proof that F was indeed received by R
from S as both these items are needed by the judge in order to be convinced
that R indeed received file F from S. Similarly, party R needed to store both
the file F and the proof that file F was indeed sent by S to R in order to
convince the judge that file F was indeed sent by S to R. Therefore, in these
previous nonrepudiation protocols, if any party S or R is not able to store
one of the two required items, then it would no longer be able to convince the
judge about its claim. However, in the nonrepudiation protocols presented in
this chapter, there is no requirement that a party S or R needs to store both
the file F and the respective proof. Only the cloud C stores the file F and the
proofs indefinitely.
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5.5 Conclusion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we have presented a new nonrepudiation protocol from
party S to party R that is implemented in a cloud C. This protocol is designed
to work such that all communications are carried out through a cloud C. The
presented protocol works in two modes. The first mode of the protocol is
designed such that at the end of its execution, party C is able to store the file
F , and the proofs needed by the two parties S and R. In the second mode of
the protocol, each party S or R asks for the file F and the needed proofs from
party C. After party C receives such a request from a party S or R, Party
C sends both the file F and the needed proofs to the respective party. The
protocol presented in this chapter has an interesting property which does not
require parties S or R to store both the file F and needed proofs. Previously,
nonrepudiation protocols required that file F and the needed proofs be stored
indefinitely as at any later time a party S or R may need these items in order
to convince a judge about its claim.
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Chapter 6
A Stabilizing Nonrepudiation Protocol Over a
Cloud
In Chapter 5 we presented a nonrepudiation protocol from party S to
party R that is implemented in cloud C. In this protocol we assume that cloud
C is able to store file F and the needed proofs by the two parties, S and R, for
an indefinite period of time. Since file F and the proofs are stored indefinitely
in cloud C, parties S and R, do not need to store file F and the needed proofs.
Whenever a party, S or R, needs file F and its needed proofs, this party just
asks for these items from cloud C through the two actions in the second mode
of the protocol.
From Chapter 5, cloud C stores five data items for each file F that is
sent from party S to party R: H(F ), F , Proof1, Proof2, and Proof3. In the
first action in the second mode of the protocol, party S asks for file F , and the
two proofs: Proof2 and Proof3. Similarly, in the second action in the second
mode, party R asks for file F and the two proofs: Proof1 and Proof2. When
cloud C receives a request from party S, it sends file F alongside Proof2 and
Proof3 to party S. Similarly, when cloud C receives a request from party R,
it sends file F alongside Proof1 and Proof2 to party R.
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In this chapter, we consider a scenario where some of the proofs that
are stored in cloud C get lost. When some of the proofs stored in cloud C are
lost, then it is possible that one party (say S) is able to receive its two needed
proofs, but the other party R is not able to receive its two needed proofs. Such
a scenario is problematic since in this case the nonrepudiation requirements
of the protocol are violated. For example let us consider the scenario where
Proof1 stored in cloud C is lost but the other two proofs Proof2 and Proof3
are still present in cloud C. In this case, party S will be able to receive its two
needed proofs, Proof2 and Proof3 but party R will not be able to receive its
two needed proofs since Proof1 is lost. Similarly, when Proof3 stored in cloud
C is lost but the two proofs, Proof1 and Proof2 are still present in cloud C,
then party R will be able to receive its two needed proofs but party S will not
be able to receive its two needed proofs since Proof3 is lost.
In this chapter, we design a new nonrepudiation protocol from party
S to party R over a cloud C which ensures that if one of the two proofs (say
Proof1) gets lost but the other proof (say Proof3) is still present in cloud C,
then eventually, no party S or R is able to receive its needed proofs from cloud
C. Since no party S or R will be able to receive its needed proofs, therefore,
the nonrepudiation requirements are not violated.
In this chapter, we make the following contributions:
• We consider the nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over cloud C which
is presented in chapter 5, and show that this protocol suffers from a
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compromised state when one of the two proofs, Proof1 or Proof3, is lost
but the other proof is still present in cloud C. In this compromised state
of the protocol one party is able to receive its needed proofs but the other
party is not able to receive its needed proofs violating the nonrepudiation
requirements of the protocol.
• We design a new nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over cloud C
which has an interesting property. This property ensures that if the
protocol ever reaches a compromised state where one of the two parties
S and R is able to receive its needed proofs but the other party is not
able to receive its needed proofs, then after some finite time period, this
compromised state changes to a state where no party is able to receive
its needed proofs from cloud C. This ensures that the nonrepudiation
requirement of the protocol is not violated.
In Section 6.1, we discuss the possible values that a proof stored in cloud
C can take. In Section 6.2 we define the state of the protocol. In Section 6.3
we introduce legitimate and illegitimate states of the protocol. We present the
new nonrepudiation protocol in Section 6.4, and conclude in Section 6.5.
6.1 Proof Values
Each of the proofs stored in cloud C can have two possible values.
Either the proof stored is the correct proof, or it is the empty proof.
The Proof1 stored in cloud C has two possible values as follows:
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Proof1 = (S,C,R,H(F ), signature by S) or Proof1 = empty proof
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is the hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of S is signed using the private key of S
The Proof2 stored in cloud C has two possible values as follows:
Proof2 = (S,C,R,H(F ), signature by C) or Proof2 = empty proof
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is the hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of C is signed using the private key of C
The Proof3 stored in cloud C has two possible values as follows:
Proof3 = (S,C,R,H(F ), signature by R) or Proof3 = empty proof
where S is the identity of party S
C is the identity of party C
R is the identity of party R
H(F ) is the hash of file F using a secure hash function H
the signature of R is signed using the private key of R
Next, we describe the state of the protocol
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6.2 Protocol State
There are a total of three parties involved in the nonrepudiation pro-
tocol from party S to party R over a cloud C. Each of these three parties has
a state associated with it. Next, we describe the state of each party.
The state of party S is the data item stored in S, which is H(F ).
Therefore, the state of party S is as follows:
state of party S: H(F )
The state of party R is the data item stored in R, which is H(F ).
Therefore, the state of party R is as follows:
state of party R: H(F )
The state of party C are the data items stored in C, which are H(F ),
F , Proof1, Proof2, and Proof3. Therefore, the state of party C is as follows:
state of party C: H(F ), F , Proof1, Proof2, Proof3
The state of the protocol is defined as the concatenation of the states
of the three parties. Therefore, the state of the protocol is defined as follows:
the state of the protocol: (state of party S, state of party R, state of party C)
Note that each of the three proofs stored in cloud C either have the
correct value or the empty value as described in the previous section.
In the next section, we discuss the legitimate and illegitimate states of
the protocol.
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6.3 Legitimate and Illegitimate States of the Protocol
The state of the protocol is called legitimate iff either both Proof1 and
Proof3 have the value of the empty proof, or both these proofs have the value
of the respective correct proof.
Next, we define the illegitimate state
The state of the protocol is illegitimate iff one of the two proofs, Proof1
or Proof3, has the value of the empty proof, but the other proof has the value
of the correct proof.
If we recall from Chapter 5, the protocol has two actions in the second
mode of the protocol. In the first action, party S asks for file F and its two
needed proofs, Proof2 and Proof3. When C receives this request from S, it
sends to S both file F and its two needed proofs. In the second action, party R
asks for file F and its two needed proofs, Proof1 and Proof2. When C receives
this request from R it sends to it both file F and its two needed proofs.
If the state of the protocol is legitimate, then each of the two parties S
and R can execute the above two actions. The result of the execution of the
two actions is that, party S ends up with file F and the two proofs, Proof2
and Proof3. Similarly, party R ends up with file F and the two proofs, Proof1
and Proof2. Since the state of the protocol is legitimate, then either both
Proof1 and Proof3 are empty, in which case both S and R will not have the
complete proof. Or both the proofs, Proof1 and Proof3 will be non-empty, in
which case, depending on the value of Proof2, either both parties will end up
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with needed proofs, or neither of the two parties will end up with the needed
proofs. Therefore, if the state of the protocol is legitimate, then executing the
first two actions, results in either both parties receiving the complete proof,
or neither of these two parties receiving its complete proof.
If the state of the protocol is illegitimate, then the result of the exe-
cution of the two actions is as follows. Party S ends up with file F and the
two proofs, Proof2 and Proof3. Similarly, party R ends up with file F and the
two proofs, Proof1 and Proof2. Since the state of the protocol is illegitimate,
which means that the value of one of the two proofs, Proof1 and Proof3, is the
empty proof, while the value of the other proof is not the empty proof. Now
we consider the following two cases.
Consider the case when Proof1 is empty proof, while Proof2, and Proof3
are the correct proofs. In this case, when the two actions of the protocol are
executed by parties S and R, then party S will end up with file F and correct
Proof2 and Proof3. On the other hand, party R will end up with file F and
correct Proof2 but the value of Proof1 will be empty. In this case, S will
end up with complete proof and can convince a judge that file F was indeed
received by R from S. But on the other hand, R will not have its needed
proofs, and will not be able to convince a judge that file F was indeed sent by
S to R.
Consider the case when Proof3 is empty proof, while Proof1, and Proof2
are the correct proofs. In this case, when the two actions of the protocol are
executed by parties S and R, then party R will end up with file F and correct
94
Proof1 and Proof2. On the other hand, party S will end up with file F and
correct Proof2 but the value of Proof3 will be empty. In this case, R will end
up with complete proof and can convince a judge that file F was indeed sent
by S to R. But on the other hand, S will not have its needed proofs, and will
not be able to convince a judge that file F was indeed received by R from S.
From the above two cases, it is clear that if the state of the protocol
is illegitimate, then when the two actions of the protocol presented in chapter
5 are executed, then the above two problematic scenarios can occur. In these
problematic scenarios, one of the two parties, S and R, ends up with its needed
proofs, but the other party does not end up with its needed proofs violating the
nonrepudiation requirements. In the next section, we present a new protocol,
which is able to avoid these problematic scenarios. In the new protocol, if
the state of the protocol is illegitimate, then after some finite time period, the
state of the protocol changes from an illegitimate state to a legitimate state.
6.4 Stabilizing Nonrepudiation Protocol
In the previous section, we discussed that if the state of the protocol
is illegitimate, then it leads to a case where the nonrepudiation requirements
of the protocol are violated. In this section, we add a third action to the non-
repudiation protocol presented in chapter 5 which adds stabilization property
to the protocol. The stabilization property ensures that if the state of the
protocol is illegitimate, then after some finite time period, the state of the
protocol changes from an illegitimate state to a legitimate state. The new
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nonrepudiation protocol fulfills the two requirements as stated below:
• If the state of the protocol is legitimate, then after executing any action
of the protocol, the state of the protocol remains as legitimate
• If the state of the protocol is illegitimate, then after some finite time
period, the state of the protocol changes from an illegitimate state to a
legitimate state.
Now we present the third action of the protocol which adds stabilization
property as discussed above. We assume that cloud C has access to a clock,
which times out periodically. Whenever cloud C times out, it checks whether
the state of the protocol is legitimate or not. If the state of the protocol is
not legitimate, then it assigns the empty proof to both the proofs, Proof1 and
Proof3. The result of assigning empty proof to the two proofs, Proof1 and
Proof3 is that the state of the protocol changes from an illegitimate state to
a legitimate state. This is because when both Proof1 and Proof3 have the
empty proof value then, both parties S and R will not be able to receive the
needed proofs from C by executing the first two actions of the protocol.
Note that C can check whether the state is legitimate by checking the
two proofs, Proof1 and Proof3 stored in cloud C. If either both the two proofs
have the correct proof value, or both the proofs have the empty proof value,
then the state of the protocol is legitimate. Otherwise the state of the protocol
is illegitimate.
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The third action of the protocol which is initiated by a timeout that
occurs in C can be represented as follows:
if (state of protocol is not legitimate) then
Proof1 := empty proof
Proof3 := empty proof
end if
Next we discuss how the third action achieves the two requirements of
the new nonrepudiation protocol. We consider two cases. In case one, the
state of the protocol is legitimate. And in case two the state of the protocol
is illegitimate.
Case 1: the state of the protocol is legitimate
If the state of the protocol is legitimate, then executing any of the three
actions takes it to a legitimate state. This is becuase the first two actions result
in C sending file F and the needed proofs to the two parties, S and R. These
two actions do not change the state of the protocol as no change in proof values
of the three proofs stored in cloud C takes place. The third action which takes
place after C times out does nothing as the state of the protocol is legitimate.
Therefore, the execution of the three actions of the protocol, results in the
state of the protocol remaining in legitimate state.
Case 2: The state of the protocol is illegitimate:
If the state of the protocol is illegitimate, then executing any of the first
two actions of the protocol will result in no change in the state of the protocol
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as these two actions do not change the value of any of the proofs stored in
cloud C. However, the third action which is initiated when a timeout occurs in
cloud C will assign the empty proof to both the proofs, Proof1 and Proof3. The
result of which is that the state of the protocol changes from an illegitimate
state to a legitimate state.
From the above two cases, it is clear that the third action provides the
stabilization property to the protocol.
6.5 Conclusion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we design a new nonrepudiation protocol from party S
to party R over cloud C that has interesting stabilization property. This stabi-
lization property ensures that as long as the state of the protocol is legitimate,
then either both parties S and R receive their needed proofs or neither of the
two parties receive their needed proofs. If the state of the protocol becomes
illegitimate, which happens when either Proof1 or Proof3 stored in cloud C
gets lost but the other data items are still stored in cloud C, then the protocol
ensures that after some finite time period, the state of the protocol changes
from an illegitimate state to a legitimate state.
The previous nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over cloud C which
is presented in Chapter 5 leads to a compromised state when one of the two
proofs, Proof1 or Proof3, stored in cloud C gets lost. In the compromised
state, one party can receive its needed proofs from cloud C, but the other
party is not able to receive its needed proofs from cloud C. In this chapter,
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we design a new nonrepudiation protocol from S to R over C which does not
suffer from this compromised state.
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Chapter 7
Multiparty Nonrepudiation Protocols in
Cloud Systems
The material presented in this chapter is based on the paper [1] 1. A
nonrepudiation protocol from a sender S to a set of potential receivers {R1,
R2, . . . , Rn} performs two functions. First, this protocol enables S to send to
every potential receiver Ri a copy of file F along with a proof that can convince
an unbiased judge that F was indeed sent by S to Ri. Second, this protocol
also enables each Ri to receive from S a copy of file F and to send back to
S a proof that can convince an unbiased judge that F was indeed received by
Ri from S. When a nonrepudiation protocol from S to {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} is
implemented in a cloud system, the communications between S and the set
of potential receivers {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} are not carried out directly. Rather,
these communications are carried out through a cloud C. In this chapter, we
present a nonrepudiation protocol that is implemented in a cloud system and
show that this protocol is correct. We also show that this protocol has two
clear advantages over nonrepudiation protocols that are not implemented in
cloud systems.
1Muqeet Ali did ninety percent of the work presented in the paper
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We present a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring a file F from a
sender S to a set of potential receivers {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}. Each potential
receiver Ri can decide on its own whether or not to receive the sent file F .
The protocol is designed to satisfy the following two requirements, called non-
repudiation requirements:
1. If a potential receiver Ri decides to receive file F , then Ri ends up ob-
taining both file F and a proof that F was indeed sent by S to Ri. In this
case, S also ends up obtaining a proof that file F was indeed received by Ri
from S.
2. If a potential receiver Ri decides not to receive file F , then Ri ends up
not obtaining both F and a proof that F was indeed sent by S to Ri, and S
ends up not obtaining a proof that F was received by Ri from S.
From Requirement 1, if a potential receiver Ri decides to receive file
F , then (i) Ri ends up obtaining a proof that F was indeed sent by S to
Ri and S can’t repudiate correctly that it has sent F to Ri, and (ii) S ends
up obtaining a proof that F was indeed received by Ri from S and Ri can’t
repudiate correctly that it has received F from S.
From Requirement 2, if a potential receiver Ri decides not to receive
file F , then (i) Ri ends up not obtaining a proof that F was sent by S to Ri
and S can repudiate correctly that it has sent F to Ri, and (ii) S ends up
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not obtaining a proof that F was received by Ri from S and Ri can repudiate
correctly that it has received F from S.
Our protocol does not support direct communications between sender S
and the potential receivers R1, R2, . . . , and Rn. Rather, the communications
between the sender and the potential receivers are carried out over a cloud C.
For example, a file F is sent from S to R1, R2, . . . , and Rn in several steps.
In the first step, sender S sends file F to cloud C. In the second step, cloud
C informs the potential receivers that it can forward file F to each of them
upon request. In the third step, any potential receiver Ri can decide to receive
file F and asks cloud C to forward file F to Ri. In the fourth step, cloud C
forwards file F to every potential receiver that has requested F .
The nonrepudiation protocol that we present in this chapter has two
clear advantages over prior nonrepudiation protocols, e.g. [29, 39, 62, 65], that
do not involve a cloud.
First, in our protocol, sender S and each potential receiver Ri sends at
most one message during execution of the protocol, regardless of the number
of potential receivers involved in the protocol. (However, as discussed below,
cloud C in our protocol sends at most 3n messages, where n is the number
potential receivers involved in the protocol.)
Second, in our protocol, each sent file F is stored only in the cloud. In
prior nonrepudiation protocols that do not involve a cloud, each sent file F is
stored in the sender and in each potential receiver that decided to receive F .
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7.1 Protocol Specification
Our nonrepudiation protocol involves (n+2) parties: a sender S, a cloud
C, and n potential receivers R1, R2, . . . , and Rn. Each one of these parties
has a private key and a public key. Each party knows its private and public
keys and knows the public keys of all other parties.
Any message that is supposed to be sent by one party and to be received
by another party during the execution of the nonrepudiation protocol can be
lost and not received by the other party. We assume that the nonrepudiation
protocol is to be executed on top of a reliable transport service (such as TCP
in the internet). This transport service takes any message that is sent by any
party during the execution of the protocol and transmits this message any
number of times until the message is ultimately received by its intended party.
Therefore, message loss due to an unreliable communication medium is not
possible.
The protocol enables sender S to send a file F over cloud C to some or
all of the potential receivers R1, R2, . . . , and Rn. It is up to each potential
receiver Ri to decide whether or not to receive the sent file F . We assume that
file F contains the identity of the sender S and the identities of all potential
receivers R1, R2, . . . , Rn.
The protocol consists of the following five steps:
1. Store File Step:
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In this step, sender S sends a message that contains file F to cloud C. This
message requests that C stores F and later forwards it to every potential re-
ceiver Ri that requests F .
2. Announce File Step:
File F which is received by cloud C in Step 1 contains the identity of each
potential receiver of F . Thus, in Step 2, cloud C sends a message to every
potential receiver of F announcing that each potential receiver can request to
receive file F from C. If a potential receiver Ri decides that it does not need
to receive file F from C, then Ri terminates without executing the remaining
steps of the protocol. On the other hand, if a potential receiver Ri decides
that it needs to receive file F from C, then this Ri proceeds to execute the
remaining steps of the protocol.
3. Request File Step:
A potential receiver Ri which decided in Step 2 that it needs to receive file F
from C sends a message to C requesting that C sends file F to Ri.
4. Send File Step:
Cloud C sends a message that contains file F to a potential receiver Ri that
requested to receive file F from C in Step 3.
5. File Received Step:
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Cloud C sends a message to sender S. This message informs S that (1) C re-
ceived file F from S in Step 1 and (2) a potential receiver Ri which requested
to receive file F from C in Step 3 later received file F from C in Step 4.
Note that if a potential receiver Ri decides that it does not need to
receive file F from cloud C, then this Ri will terminate its execution at Step
2. However if Ri decides that it needs to receive file F from C, then this Ri
will terminate its execution at Step 4.
For this protocol to be a nonrepudiation protocol, execution of the
protocol needs to satisfy the following two requirements, called nonrepudiation
requirements, for each potential receiver Ri:
NR1. If during execution of the protocol Ri decides to receive file F
from cloud C, then Ri ends up obtaining both F and a proof that F was
indeed sent by S to Ri. Also S ends up obtaining a proof that F was indeed
received by Ri from S.
NR2. If during execution of the protocol Ri decides not to receive file
F from cloud C, then Ri ends up not obtaining F and not obtaining a proof
that F was sent by S to Ri. Also S ends up not obtaining a proof that F was
received by Ri from S.
The two nonrepudiation requirements NR1 and NR2 mention two proofs:
a proof that F was sent by S to Ri and a proof that F was received by Ri
from S. However because our protocol does not support direct communica-
tions between S and Ri, it is more convenient to replace each one of these
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proofs by two proofs.
Therefore, the proof that F was sent by S to Ri is replaced by the
following two proofs:
Proof 1: A proof that F was sent by S to C
Proof 2: A proof that F was sent by C to Ri
Also, the proof that F was received by Ri from S is replaced by the
following two proofs:
Proof 3: A proof that F was received by Ri from C
Proof 4: A proof that F was received by C from S
As discussed below, Proof 1 is computed by S and Proof 2 is computed
by C, then both these proofs are ultimately sent to Ri. Later, Ri can combine
these two proofs and end up with a proof that F was sent by S to Ri as
dictated by the nonrepudiation requirement NR1.
Similarly, Proof 3 is computed by Ri and proof 4 is computed by C,
then both these proofs are ultimately sent to S. Therefore, S can combine
these two proofs and end up with a proof that F was received by Ri from S
as dictated by the nonrepudiation requirement NR1.
The five steps of the protocol can now be refined to show how the four
proofs are exchanged between S, C, and Ri during execution of the protocol:
1. Store File Step:
In this step, sender S sends a message that contains both file F and Proof 1
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to cloud C. This message requests that C stores F and later forwards it to
every potential receiver Ri that requests F .
2. Announce File Step:
File F which is received by cloud C in Step 1 contains the identity of each
potential receiver of F . Thus, in Step 2, cloud C sends a message to every
potential receiver of F announcing that each potential receiver can request to
receive file F from C. If a potential receiver Ri decides that it does not need
to receive file F from C, then Ri terminates without executing the remaining
steps of the protocol. On the other hand, if a potential receiver Ri decides that
it needs to receive file F from C, then Ri proceeds to execute the remaining
steps of the protocol.
3. Request File Step:
A potential receiver Ri which decided in Step 2 that it needs to receive file F
from C sends a message that contains Proof 3 to C requesting that C sends
file F to Ri.
4. Send File Step:
Cloud C sends a message that contains both file F and Proof 2 to a potential
receiver Ri that requested to receive file F from C in Step 3.
5. File Received Step:
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Cloud C sends a message that contains both Proof 3 and Proof 4 to sender S.
This message informs S that (1) C received file F from S in Step 1 and (2) a
potential receiver Ri which requested to receive file F from C in Step 3 later
received file F from C in Step 4.
The five steps of the nonrepudiation protocol can now be summarized as fol-
lows:
1. Store File Step:
S → C : (F , Proof 1)
In this step, S computes Proof 1 and sends file F and Proof 1 to C.
2. Announce File Step:
{R1, R2, . . . , Rn} ← C : Proof 1
In this step, C forwards Proof 1 to every potential receiver of F . If some Ri
decides that it does not need to receive file F , then this Ri does not execute
the remaining steps of the protocol. Otherwise, Ri proceeds to execute the
remaining steps of the protocol.
3. Request File Step:
Ri → C : Proof 3
In this step, Ri computes Proof 3 and sends it to C.
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4. Send File Step:
Ri ← C : (F , Proof 2)
In this step, C computes Proof 2 and sends file F (received in Step 1) and
Proof 2 to Ri which requested file F in Step 3.
5. File Received Step:
S ← C: (Proof 3, Proof 4)
In this step, C computes Proof 4 and sends both Proof 3 (which C received
in Step 3) and Proof 4 to S.
7.2 Protocol Verification
In this section, we prove that any execution of the protocol specified in
the previous section satisfies the two nonrepudiation requirements NR1 and
NR2 for each potential receiver Ri.
Proof of NR1: Assume that during some execution of the protocol, Ri
decides to receive file F from cloud C. In this case, Ri proceeds to execute
Steps 2, 3, and 4, then S proceeds to execute Step 5. Thus, Ri ends up
receiving Proof 1 in Step 2 and receiving file F and Proof 2 in Step 4. As
mentioned earlier, Ri can combine the two Proofs 1 and 2 to construct a proof
that file F was indeed sent by S to Ri. Therefore, Ri ends up obtaining both
file F and a proof that file F was indeed sent by S to Ri. Similarly, S ends up
receiving the two Proofs 3 and 4. As mentioned earlier, S can combine these
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two proofs to construct a proof that file F was indeed received by Ri from
S. Therefore, S ends up obtaining a proof that file F was indeed received
by Ri from S. This execution of the protocol satisfies the nonrepudiation
requirement NR1.
Proof of NR2: Assume that during some execution of the protocol,
Ri decides not to receive file F from cloud C. In this case, Ri terminates
immediately after executing Step 2 and never gets to execute Step 3 or Step 4.
Thus, Ri never gets to receive file F and never gets to receive Proof 2 before
it terminates. Because Ri needs Proof 2 (along with Proof 1) to construct a
proof that F was indeed sent by S to Ri, Ri ends up not obtaining file F and
not obtaining a proof that F was sent by S to Ri. Similarly, S never gets
to execute Step 5 and never gets to receive Proof 3 or Proof 4. Because S
needs both Proofs 3 and 4 to construct a proof that file F was indeed received
by Ri from S, S ends up not obtaining a proof that F was indeed received
by Ri from S. This execution of the protocol satisfies the nonrepudiation
requirement NR2.
7.3 Computing the Four Proofs
In this section, we discuss how each of the four proofs (namely Proof 1,
2, 3, and 4) is computed during any execution of the nonrepudiation protocol.
Proof 1 indicates that file F was sent by S to C. This proof can be
computed as the signed tuple (S, C, H(F )), which is signed using the private
key of S, where
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S is the identity of the sender of file F
C is the identity of the receiver of file F
H(F ) is a hashing of file F using the secure hashing function H
The tuple (S, C, H(F )) is signed using the private key of S
Note that only S can compute Proof 1 because only S knows its own private
key. Also, C and each potential receiver of file F can check the correctness of
Proof 1 because each of them knows the public key of S. Proof 1 is computed
by S and is sent to C during Step 1 of the protocol. Then this proof is
later forwarded by C to every potential receiver of file F during Step 2 of the
protocol.
Proof 2 indicates that file F was sent by C to a potential receiver Ri
that requested to receive F from C. This proof can be computed as the signed
tuple (C, Ri, H(F )), which is signed using the private key of C, where
C is the identity of the sender of file F
Ri is the identity of the receiver of file F
H(F ) is a hashing of file F using the secure hashing function H
The tuple (C, Ri, H(F )) is signed using the private key of C
Note that only C can compute Proof 2 because only C knows its own private
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key. Also, each potential receiver of file F can check the correctness of Proof
2 because each of them knows the public key of C. Proof 2 is computed by C
and is sent to a potential receiver Ri during Step 4 of the protocol provided
that Ri requested to receive file F from C during Step 3 of the protocol.
Proof 3 indicates that file F was received by a potential receiver Ri
from C. This proof can be computed as the signed tuple (C, Ri, H(F )),
which is signed using the private key of Ri, where
C is the identity of the sender of file F
Ri is the identity of the receiver of file F
H(F ) is a hashing of file F using the secure hashing function H
The tuple (C, Ri, H(F )) is signed using the private key of Ri
Note that only Ri can compute Proof 3 because only Ri knows its own private
key. Also, each of C and S can check the correctness of Proof 3 because each
of them knows the public key of each Ri. Proof 3 is computed by Ri and is
sent to C during Step 3 of the protocol. Then this proof is forwarded by C to
S during Step 5 of the protocol.
Proof 4 indicates that file F was received by C from S. This proof
can be computed as the signed tuple (S, C, H(F )), which is signed using the
private key of C, where
112
S is the identity of the sender of file F
C is the identity of the receiver of file F
H(F ) is a hashing of file F using the secure hashing function H
The tuple (S, C, H(F )) is signed using the private key of C
Note that only C can compute Proof 4 because only C knows its own private
key. Also, S can check the correctness of Proof 4 because S knows the public
key of C. Proof 4 is computed by C and is sent to S during Step 5 of the
protocol.
7.4 Communication Complexity of the Protocol
In this section, we compute an upper bound on the number of messages
that are sent (and received) during execution of the nonrepudiation protocol.
Step 1 is executed once, and one message is sent when this step is exe-
cuted.
Step 2 is executed once, and n messages are sent when this step is exe-
cuted.
Step 3 is executed at most n times, and one message is sent when this
step is executed.
Step 4 is executed at most n times, and one message is sent when this
step is executed.
Step 5 is executed at most n times, and one message is sent when this
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step is executed.
It follows that at most 4n+1 messages are sent during execution of the nonre-
pudiation protocol. Of these messages, only one message is sent by sender S
(in Step 1), at most one message is sent by each potential receiver Ri (in Step
3), and at most 3n messages are sent by cloud C (in Steps 2, 4, and 5).
Now consider any nonrepudiation protocol that does not involve a
cloud. This protocol involves only a sender S and n potential receivers R1,
R2, . . . , Rn. (Examples of such protocols are presented in [29, 39].) During
execution of this protocol, sender S needs to send at least one message to each
potential receiver Ri in order to ensure that Ri obtains a proof that file F has
been sent by S to Ri. Also, each potential receiver Ri needs to send at least
one message to sender S in order to ensure that S obtains a proof that file F
has been received by Ri from S.
Therefore, one advantage of our nonrepudiation protocol that involves
a cloud over any nonrepudiation protocol that does not involve a cloud is to
reduce the number of messages that sender S needs to send during execution
of the protocol from n messages to a single message.
7.5 The Cloud as a Permanent Storage of Files
When execution of the nonrepudiation protocol terminates, cloud C
ends up with the following two items:
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File F
The hash H(F ) of file F
We assume that cloud C keeps these two items indefinitely.
Similarly, when execution of the nonrepudiation protocol terminates,
sender S ends up with four items for each potential receiver Ri that has re-
quested to receive file F in Step 3:
File F
The hash H(F ) of file F
Proof 3
Proof 4
Note that the potential receiver Ri that requested to receive file F in Step 3
is named in Proof 3. Also note that S needs to keep these four items indef-
initely because at any time in the future S may need to use these four items
to prove to a judge that file F was indeed received by some potential receiver
Ri (named in Proof 3) from S.
Fortunately, because of our assumption that cloud C keeps the two
items F and H(F ) indefinitely, sender S does not need to keep file F in-
definitely. Rather, when S needs to get file F , it gets file F from cloud C.
Therefore, sender S needs to indefinitely keep the following three items for
each potential receiver Ri that has requested to receive file F in Step 3:
The hash H(F ) of file F
Proof 3
Proof 4
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Similarly, when execution of the nonrepudiation protocol terminates, each po-
tential receiver Ri that has requested to receive file F in Step 3 ends up with
the following four items:
File F
The hash H(F ) of file F
Proof 1
Proof 2
Note that each Ri that has requested to receive file F in Step 3 needs to keep
these four items indefinitely because at any time in the future Ri may need to
use these four items to prove to a judge that file F was indeed sent by S to
Ri.
Fortunately, because of our assumption that cloud C keeps the two
items F and H(F ) indefinitely, each potential receiver Ri that has requested
to receive file F in Step 3 does not need to keep file F indefinitely. Rather,
when Ri needs to get file F , it gets file F from cloud C. Therefore, each Ri
that has requested to receive file F in Step 3 needs to indefinitely keep the
following three items:
The hash H(F ) of file F
Proof 1
Proof 2
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7.6 Conclusion and Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we presented a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring
files from a sender S to a set of potential receivers {R1,R2, . . . , Rn}. The
presented protocol does not support direct communications between the sender
and the potential receivers. Rather, the communications between the sender
and the potential receivers are carried out through a cloud C.
For convenience, let P denote the nonrepudiation file transfer protocol
presented in this chapter. Also let Q denote any nonrepudiation file transfer
protocol that does not involve a cloud. Then, protocol P has two advantages
over protocol Q. First, to transfer one file F (from the sender to the potential
receivers), the sender in protocol P ends up sending only one message, whereas
the sender in protocol Q ends up sending n messages, where n is the number
of potential receivers of file F . Second, protocol P needs to store only one
copy of each transferred file, whereas protocol Q needs to store (n+1) copies
of each transferred file. (The stored copy of each transferred file in protocol
P is stored in cloud C, and the stored (n+1) copies of each transferred file in
protocol Q are stored in the sender and in the potential receivers of the file.)
In the nonrepudiation file transfer protocol presented in this chapter,
execution of each potential receiver Ri is guaranteed to terminate but exe-
cution of sender S is not guaranteed to terminate. Specifically, execution of
Ri either terminates after executing Step 2 (if Ri decides not to receive file
F from the cloud C) or terminates after executing Step 4 (if Ri decides to
receive file F from cloud C). However, if Ri decides not to receive file F from
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cloud C, then execution of Step 5 in the protocol never terminates and sender
S will continue to wait indefinitely for a “file F received message” that will
never arrive. This problem can be solved by assuming that there is an upper
bound of T seconds on the elapsed time after execution of Step 1 is terminated
and before execution of Step 5 is terminated. Now, after sender S executes
Step 1, it waits to receive a “file F received message” in Step 5. But if S
waits for T seconds without receiving the “file F received message”, then S
concludes that the “file F received message” has not been sent and will not be
sent (indicating that Ri has decided not to receive file F from the cloud C),
and so S terminates.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion and Future Work
In this dissertation, we have presented many novel contributions to the
design of nonrepudiation protocols, which we refer to as the second gener-
ation of nonrepudiation protocols. The inspiration behind designing second
generation of nonrepudiation protocols was based on several limitations and
drawbacks of the first generation of these protocols. We have addressed many
limitations and drawbacks in this dissertaion. In Chapter 3, we presented
two-phase nonrepudiation protocols, which are easy to specify and verify as
compared to a nonrepudiation protocol which is not two-phase. The two-phase
protocols are inherently deterministic, and do not make use of real-time clocks.
These characteristics make the specification and verification of these protocols
much easier.
In Chapter 4, we relax the requirement of not making use of real-time
clocks, and assume that party R is allowed to keep a real-time clock. In
Chapter 4, we present the first nonrepudiation protocol from party S to party
R that does not involve a trusted third party T which only makes a set of
reasonable assumptions. The design of this protocol answered an important
question in the design of nonrepudiation protocols which asked whether a
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nonrepudiation protocol can be designed which only involves party S and
party R and does not rely on a set of unreasonable assumptions.
Chapter 5 presents a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring file F
from party S to party R which is implemented in a cloud C. This protocol
is designed such that all communication takes place through a cloud C, and
each party can receive its needed proof. In this protocol the only copy of file
F and the needed proofs is stored in cloud C.
In Chapter 6, we design a nonrepudiation protocol from S to R where
some of the proofs stored in cloud C get lost. We first show that the previ-
ous nonrepudiation protocol in Chapter 5 suffers from a compromised state
when some of the proofs stored in cloud C get lost. We then present a new
nonrepudiation protocol which does not suffer from this compromised state.
In Chapter 7, we design a nonrepudiation protocol for transferring files
from a sender S to a subset of potential receivers {R.1, R.2, . . ., R.n} over a
cloud C which is a generalization of the nonrepudiation protocol presented in
Chapter 5.
Although we have made a number of contributions to the design of
nonrepudiation protocols, several avenues of future work still remain. Below
we discuss some of the avenues for future work:
1. In Chapter 6, we have presented a nonrepudiation protocol that has
nice stabilization property. We have only presented this protocol for the
case of three parties: party S, party R, and party C. One natural ques-
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tion is how to extend this protocol to work for the case of n+2 parties:
party S, party R.1, R.2, . . . , R.n, and party C.
2. In Chapter 4, we presented a nonrepudiation protocol from S to
R that does not involve a trusted third party T . The presented protocol
in that Chapter only takes into consideration a single message m that
needs to be sent from party S to party R. One could further investigate
whether the presented protocol can be used to design a nonrepudiated
negotiation protocol where there is an exchange of a sequence of mes-
sages m.1, m.2, . . . , m.n where each even-numbered message is sent from
S to R, and each odd-numbered message is sent from R to S. Each party
wants a proof of the exchange of messages. In this case, one needs to
investigate whether a single execution of the presented protocol is suffi-
cient to design such a nonrepudiated negotiation protocol or not?
3. Another area of future work is to design a certified email protocol
that does not involve a trusted third party. One could try to adapt
the nonrepudiation protocol presented in Chapter 4 in order to design a
certified email protocol that does not involve a trusted third party. It
would be interesting to see how the necessary and sufficient conditions
presented in Chapter 4 change when designing a new protocol for the
certified email.
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